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Abstract 
This paper examines the implications of “modern” regulatory governance - i.e. the inception of 
Independent Regulatory Authorities (IRAs) - for the investment decisions of a large sample of EU 
publicly traded regulated firms from 1994 to 2004. These firms provide massively consumed services, 
and this is why governments are highly sensitive to regulatory decisions and outcomes. We therefore 
analyse and empirically investigate if: i) the inception of IRAs reduces the time-inconsistency 
problems that lead regulated firms to underinvest, and ii) governments’ political orientation and 
residual state ownership interfere with investment decisions. To control for potential endogeneity of 
the key institutional variables, we draw our identification strategy from the political economy 
literature. Our results show that regulatory independence has a positive impact on regulated firms’ 
investment while private vs. state ownership is not significant. We also find that, under executives at 
the extreme of the political spectrum, government interference in the functioning of the IRA is likely 
to re-introduce instability and uncertainty in the regulatory framework, thus undermining investment 
incentives. 
Keywords 
Institutions; Firm Investment; Private and State ownership; Regulatory Independence; Government’s 
Political Orientation 
JEL Classification: D92, K23, L33, L51, L90 
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1. Introduction* 
Since the early 1990's, the public utility sector in the European Union has gone through substantial structural 
reforms that include liberalization of the markets, privatization of state-owned firms and the institution of 
independent agencies to regulate the provision of utility services. When evaluating the effect of these 
reforms, infrastructure investment is perhaps the most important economic dimension because of its impact 
on welfare and dynamic efficiency. On the one hand, public utilities typically deliver essential services 
through a network, which must be constantly maintained and upgraded to provide them in appropriate 
quantity and quality, and at reasonable prices. On the other hand, infrastructure investment is an 
acknowledged driving force of the economy and a major determinant of economic growth, often used as a 
counter-cyclical policy tool.1 Guthrie (2006), for example, estimates that network industries, like energy, 
telecommunications, railways, airports, ports and water supply contribute, on average, 5% of the GDP of 
OECD countries, while gross fixed capital formation in these industries adds up to almost 15% of total 
investment in the non agricultural business sector. 
The implementation of market liberalization, privatization, and of regulatory reforms, however, differ 
considerably across member states and industries, because the European Commission set the general 
framework and the guidelines while national governments set the pace of the process. The most important of 
these reforms is perhaps the institution of Independent Regulatory Authorities (IRAs) that the European 
Commission urged national governments to set up, in order to regulate the activity of network industries and 
to discipline the potential conflict of interest between the executive and state owned utilities.2 In this paper 
we study how varying regulatory institutions and ownership patterns affect regulated firms’ investment 
decision. We contend that the establishment of Independent Regulatory Authorities has a positive influence 
on public utilities’ investment and empirically investigate whether this influence is entwined with residual 
state ownership and government’s political stance about state intervention in the economy.  
Why is regulatory independence so critical? When regulators are “not independent”, the government3 can 
either directly force or indirectly influence them to ex-post modify their decisions, thus constraining their 
ability to commit to their regulatory policy. This lack of commitment leads to time-inconsistent regulatory 
decisions, undermining firms’ investment incentives: if regulators ex post are induced to revise their 
decisions, capital expenditures in new infrastructure, typically large, specific and sunk, can be expropriated, 
or not fully recovered by the investing firm. Thus, uncertainty in the regulatory policy negatively affects 
firms’ investment decisions. The rationale behind the institution of an independent authority lies in the 
attempt to insulate regulators from political interference aimed at influencing regulated firms’ investment or 
employment decisions, particularly when the government has ownership stakes in the utility.4 Institutions 
like central banks and IRAs, are typically designed to limit political interference and supposed to enhance 
                                                     
* We thank Marc Bourreau, Tomaso Duso, Philippe Gagnepain, Rachel Griffith, Klaus Gugler, Giuseppe Nicoletti, Marco Pagano, 
Alessandro Sembenelli, Carine Staropoli, Davide Vannoni and Andrea Vindigni, and seminar participants at the 8th IIOC 
Conference (Vancouver, 2010), the 37th Annual Conference of the EARIE, (Istanbul, 2010), CES – University of Paris I, OECD-
Economic Department, CSEF–University of Naples, University of Trento, and at WZB-Humboldt University in Berlin for 
comments and suggestions. We are grateful to Bernardo Bortolotti and FEEM- Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei for balance sheet, 
ownership and institutional data and to Fabrizio Gilardi for regulatory data. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support 
from the Italian Ministry of Education (No. 20089PYFHY_004). 
1 For example, using a panel of OECD countries observed from 1996 to 2007, Czernich et al. (2011) find that a 10 percentage-
point increase in broadband penetration, as a proxy of broadband deployment, raises annual per-capita growth by 0.9-1.5 
percentage points. 
2 The OECD (2002), for example, describes IRAs as “one of the most widespread institutions of modern regulatory governance”. 
3 In this paper, we address independence of regulators from politicians, not from the regulated firm’s stakeholders, as this form of 
regulatory capture is beyond the scope of the paper.  
4 That politicians may be “bad regulators” is eloquently described by Stigler (1971, p. 3): “the political process defies rational 
explanation: ‘politics’ is an imponderable, a constantly and unpredictably shifting mixture of forces of the most diverse nature, 
comprehending acts of great moral virtue (the emancipation of slaves) and of the most vulgar venality (the congressman 
feathering his own nest)”.  
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regulators’ credibility and commitment.5 Therefore, the design of regulatory authorities, if credible, includes 
institutional arrangements that restrain the government from opportunistic expropriation of the utilities’ 
investments. 
Utility sectors, however, are a special case of interest because the services they provide are massively 
consumed by the citizenry, and governments have the latitude and the interest to influence the pace of 
liberalization, privatization and regulatory reforms, in line with their political stance and objectives. 
Therefore, despite EU driven product market reforms, and notwithstanding the presence of an independent 
authority, politicians may still try to pursue their partisan goals by interfering with (private and state owned) 
public utilities’ decisions in order to be re-elected or simply because they want to achieve their favourite 
policy outcome.  
The degree of independence and the credibility of newly set up authorities are likely to depend on how 
much power Governments are willing to delegate. A regulatory agency can be provided with formal 
independence, i.e. with the right to decide on specified matters, but this formal (de jure) authority not 
necessarily confers the real (de facto) authority, that is the effective control over the decisions, independent 
of politics or politicians. Aghion and Tirole (1997) present a theory of the allocation of formal and real 
authority within organizations which shows that an increase in real authority (through delegation of powers) 
enhances the regulator’s incentive and initiative to acquire the relevant information on the regulated activity, 
but results in a loss of control by politicians. This trade-off affects the degree of delegation from politicians 
to regulators and, in turn, the credibility and effectiveness of regulatory intervention.  
The complex nature of the link between independent regulation and politics motivates the following 
research questions, i.e. Does the creation of independent regulatory agencies affect public utilities’ 
investment decisions, and do privatized and partially privatized firms respond differently? What is the 
interaction with politics? Does the IRA succeed in constraining political interference in public utilities’ 
investment decisions? To answer these questions, we estimate an econometric model of firm investment in 
which we take explicitly into account (i) the degree of independence of regulatory agencies, as it varies 
across sectors, countries and time; (ii) the share of state ownership of regulated utilities, as it changes over 
time and across firms, and (iii) the change over time in the political orientation of national governments, as 
this may ultimately influence the regulatory climate to be either pro-firm or pro-consumers.6  
Our paper belongs to the recent strand of the political economy literature that investigates the impact of 
either policy reforms or institutions on a variety of economic dimensions, addressing the potential 
endogeneity of reforms. One branch of this literature has a broad historical perspective to analyse how social 
and political institutions affect economic development.7 Another branch investigates the micro-economic 
consequences of reforms. Among the others, Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) study the effect of labour market 
institutions on employment growth in France; Besley and Burgess (2004) investigate the impact of labour 
regulation reforms on the economic performance of manufacturing industry in India; Alesina et al. (2005) 
and Griffith et al. (2007) study the effect of product market reforms on liberalized sectors’ aggregate 
investment and unemployment, respectively.  
This study also is on firms’ responses to institutional reforms, in that we study the effect of the institution 
of the IRA by national governments on regulated firms’ investment decisions. To test this effect 
econometrically we construct a panel dataset of 80 EU-15 publicly traded firms which operate in energy, 
                                                     
5 According to Alesina and Tabellini (2008), regulation of public utilities is an example of “policies that lend themselves to 
bureaucratic delegation, since they pit special interests against those of consumers as a whole” (page 444). Perino (2010) shows 
that delegation unambiguously increases credibility, especially when new information affects the ex ante policy. 
6 See Friedman (1962) and Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) for the influence of partisan politics and ideology on economic policies. 
While leftwing parties are rarely associated with market-oriented policies, rightwing parties are generally viewed as more in 
favor of deregulation and less inclined to support consumers’ interests (see also Benoit and Laver, 2006). This insight is 
consistent with empirical evidence on the effect of government’s ideology on fiscal policy, suggesting that leftwing executives 
are more willing to increase the size of the government through taxation and public expenditure than rightwing one; see, among 
the others, Alesina et al. (1997) and Ticchi and Vindigni (2010). 
7 See, among the others, Persson and Tabellini (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Persson (2002) and Tabellini 
(2010). 
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telecommunications, water and transport infrastructures and cover more than 85% of quoted European 
utilities from 1994 and 2004. The sample comprises 10 of the top 30 companies in terms of market 
capitalization within the European Industrial Sector (Mediobanca Investment Bank, 2009). Utilities and 
telecommunications companies in Europe play a much more prominent role within financial markets vis à vis 
the U.S. where only two firms (AT&T and Verizon) rank among the top thirty. We complement firm-level 
data with country and sector specific variables on the regulatory framework and the political environment. 
To measure regulatory independence we use two alternative variables: a dummy that equals 1 in the year the 
Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA) was set up and thereafter, and an index of formal regulatory 
independence (Gilardi, 2005) which is based on key dimensions of the regulatory framework.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature along three directions. First, while most studies focus on 
utilities in developing countries, we provide evidence for regulated firms in Europe, which is particularly 
interesting but complex to analyse, due to its cross-country institutional and political differences that persist 
despite the single market program and the monetary union. Second, although other papers do examine the 
relationship between the regulatory framework and investment, they do not consider its interplay with firm 
ownership and government partisanship. Third, following Acemoglu (2005)’s argument that political 
institutions should be treated as endogenous, we use an identification strategy borrowed from the applied 
political economy literature to control for the potential endogeneity of the key variables that may affect the 
investment decisions of regulated firms – such as the establishment of the IRA, its interaction with the 
Government, and firm ownership. In fact, politicians may decide to set up an independent regulatory 
authority just because they seek to expand or modernize the country’s infrastructure and, accordingly, 
delegate some power in order to make the regulatory environment more stable, reduce the threat of hold up 
and bolster the investment incentives of regulated firms. By the same token, if the budget constraint is hard, 
the decision to privatise state-owned monopolists is likely be influenced by the need to carry out huge 
investment programs. To identify the direction of the relationship between investments, independent 
regulation, firm ownership and politics, we rely on instrumental variables techniques, and use alternative sets 
of time-varying characteristics of the political and financial institutions.  
Our results show that regulatory independence does matter for the investment of regulated firms. More 
specifically, investments increase when an IRA is in place, or the more independent is the regulator, and this 
effect does not depend on firm ownership or on the extent of market liberalization. We also find that 
government’s political orientation does matter, as investment is found to increase under more conservative 
(pro-firm) governments, but this positive effect appears to shrink and even change its sign if an IRA exists, 
or the higher is regulatory independence. On the one hand, our results suggest that the IRA restrains political 
interference; on the other hand, they also suggest that political interference in the regulatory functions of the 
independent authorities can be detrimental to investment incentives. The tension arising between politicians 
and regulators is thus likely to bring back instability and uncertainty in the regulatory framework  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature background. In 
Section 3, we describe the institutional context. In Section 4 we present our identification strategy and in 
Section 5 we describe the dataset and define the variables and the instruments. In Section 6, we present the 
econometric model and the estimation methodology while in Section 7 we present the results. Section 8 
concludes. 
2. Literature Background 
Regulated firms have to sustain substantial investment expenditures to construct and operate network 
infrastructures. Since public utility services are used by a the population at large, their prices are an issue of 
public concern, and regulators may be urged by public pressure and politicians to revise regulated charges as 
soon as investment expenditures are sunk.  
The importance of regulatory independence is closely associated to the problem of time-inconsistency in 
regulation, i.e. the well-known regulatory opportunism, or hold up, problem.8 The theory shows that 
                                                     
8 See, for example, the survey by Armstrong and Sappington (2007). 
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regulatory opportunism leads regulated firms to underinvest (Besanko and Spulber, 1992). Whenever 
regulators cannot commit to long-term regulated prices, they may have an incentive to reduce the regulated 
rates ex post – i.e. once the firm's investment is sunk - in order to benefit consumers at the expense of the 
firm's owners.9 More recently, Strausz (2011) models regulatory risk as uncertainty about the regulator’s 
objective function – the weight attached to firm profits and the cost of public funds - and studies its impact 
on investment incentives. The view of an independent regulatory authority as the necessary condition for 
policy credibility is by Levy and Spiller (1994), who show that “independence” improves the regulators' 
ability to make long-term commitments to regulatory decisions and, as a consequence, that sunk investments 
are less likely expropriated ex post. Interestingly for our purposes, they also show that the credibility and 
effectiveness of a regulatory framework varies with a country’s political and social institutions. 10 
State ownership is another institutional factor that must be taken into account when assessing the merits 
of economic reforms in the public utility sector. State-owned enterprises tend to be less cost-efficient 
because their managers obtain only a fraction of the benefits from cost-saving activities, face soft-budget 
constraints and are more likely influenced by politicians (Hart et al., 1997; Shleifer, 1998). Governments 
may in fact demand regulators to use the assets of state-owned utilities for policy objectives (e.g. to extend 
the universal service obligation or to provide the service in geographically disadvantaged areas) rather than 
to pursue profit maximization (Laffont and Tirole, 1991). Politicians’ interference may thus impair the 
ability of regulators to commit. As shown by Bias and Perotti (2002), however, the costs of regulatory 
opportunism can be raised by encouraging “widespread” privatisation and fragmented ownership structures, 
where investors/voters may urge governments not to reduce shareholders’ value through political 
interference in regulatory policy. Privatisation may thus deliver benefits – in terms of commitment powers – 
similar to the establishment of an independent regulator, as in the seminal paper by Sappington and Stiglitz 
(1987), who also show that the promise not to intervene ex-post is more credible under private ownership.11  
Very few empirical studies investigate the relationship among regulatory independence and investment 
and even less take firm ownership into account. Moreover, most of these studies look at the public utility 
sector in developing countries or at one individual sector. Gutiérrez (2003) finds, for telecom companies in 
Latin American and Caribbean countries from 1980 to 1997, that regulatory independence has a positive 
impact on the number of phone lines per capita. Cubbin and Stern (2005) show, for a panel of electric 
utilities in developing countries from 1980 to 2001, that the existence of an independent regulator is 
associated with higher generating capacity. Egert (2009), using industry level data from 13 OECD countries, 
shows that incentive regulation implemented jointly with an independent regulator has a sizeable positive 
impact on investment in network industries, though the two variables do not display any significant effect 
when taken separately. The empirical evidence on the impact of firm’s ownership on investment is mixed. 
Early studies show, for a variety of countries and industries, that privatizations led to higher fixed investment 
and innovation.12 More recently, Gupta (2005) finds that partial, but not full, privatisation of Indian state-
owned enterprises had a positive impact on privatised firms’ investment from 1990 to 2000. Cambini and 
Rondi (2010), investigating the effect of incentive regulation, find that firm ownership has no significant 
impact on the investment of energy utilities’ in five large EU countries in the decade 1997-2007. Finally, 
Wallsten (2001) finds that the privatization of telecom providers in Latin America and Africa was positively 
related to larger investment in connection capacity and phone penetration, but only where an independent 
regulator exists. Notably, none of these studies includes government’s political orientation to control for 
direct government’s interference over investment decisions. 
                                                     
9 Building on this, Spiegel and Spulber (1994) show that firms can strategically use financial leverage and bankruptcy risk to 
discipline regulatory opportunism in order to shield investment incentives. Bortolotti, Cambini, Rondi and Spiegel (2011; BCRS 
hereafter) provide empirical evidence to the strategic relationship between debt and regulated rates.  
10 Further advantages of independent regulatory authorities include enhanced expertise, flexibility in decision-making and sector-
specific knowledge that reduces asymmetric information problems. Altogether, these features promote stability and continuity of 
regulators’ course of action, enhancing their credibility (Majone, 1997). 
11 For a recent survey on the costs and benefits of privatisation see Martimort (2006) 
12 See Megginson and Netter (2001) for a survey. 
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Similarly to regulatory independence, competition may, in principle, strengthen regulated firms’ 
incentives to invest. The empirical evidence on the complementarity between competition and regulation, 
however, is mixed. Ai and Sappington (2002), find that the impact of incentive regulation on U.S. telecoms’ 
investment between 1986 and 1999 is more substantial where competition is tougher. Alesina et al. (2005) 
show, for non-manufacturing industries in 21 OECD countries from 1975 to 1996, that more competitive and 
less intensely regulated markets have higher aggregate investment at sectoral level. Our paper differs because 
we focus on an EU-wide panel of firms in many sectors and use firm-level data.  
Last but not least, we consider how political institutions are likely to affect regulated firms’ decisions. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) theoretically analyse the behaviour of private and public enterprises in situations 
where politicians try to influence firms to pursue political objectives. They show that “an important 
determinant of whether politicians want firms to be private or public is their ability to get tangible political 
benefits out of public ownership. The greater the independence of public firms from politicians, the less 
attractive public ownership for politicians” (pp. 1022-1023). Their framework, however, does not encompass 
the role of independent regulation and its interplay with political partisanship. Henisz and Zelner (2001) and 
Zelner and Henisz (2006) analyse and empirically investigate the impact of political institutions on regulated 
firms’ investment. More specifically, Henisz and Zelner (2001) use telecommunications operators in 147 
countries during the period 1960–1994, and find that the credibility of the political regime as measured by 
political institution variables (such as the presence of low and upper chambers, judiciary and some federal 
institutions, the effective systems of checks and balances, etc.) imposes stronger constraints on managers’ 
discretion that positively affect investment. Zelner and Henisz (2006) use a panel of state-owned electric 
utilities from 78 countries (1970-1994) to investigate if veto powers and interest group pressure influence the 
annual rate of deployment of electricity generating capacity. In their view, state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
may be driven by political actors to undertake excessive investment projects (the so-called “white 
elephants”) that provide targeted economic benefits to their constituencies. The empirical results support the 
hypothesis that the impact on electrical infrastructure investment by political institutions that constraint the 
behaviour of political actors varies with the level of interest group competition (households vs. industrial 
users) faced by electric utilities. 13 
The recent empirical literature on regulation and politics focuses on how both governments’ ideology and 
political systems affect market reforms in regulated industries. Li and Xu (2002) investigate the political 
economy of privatisation and competition in 45 countries from 1990 to 1998. They show that democratic 
countries with strong pro-reform and pro-market interest groups are more likely to privatise firms and 
liberalize markets within the fixed telephone sector than less democratic governments. Gilardi (2005) finds 
that, in West European countries, the need to improve credible commitment when privatising and liberalising 
increases the likelihood to set up an IRA and that this likelihood increases with political uncertainty and 
instability. Duso and Seldeslachts (2010), using data from the mobile telecom industry of 24 OECD 
countries in the period 1991-1997, show that executives in favour of de-regulation and small welfare states 
speed up market entry while pro-regulation governments slows down liberalization. Finally, Potrafke (2010), 
finds, for OECD countries from 1975 to 2003, that rightwing and market-oriented governments foster 
product market deregulation.  
All these studies show that regulatory institutions and market reforms are influenced by political 
decisions according to the specific social and political goals of the government in charge. This evidence 
suggests that the decision to delegate specific powers to an independent authority, as well as the decision to 
privatise regulated utilities may be endogenous. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first one in the 
recent literature on political economy of regulation that allows for the potential endogeneity of both the 
existence of independent regulation and the residual state ownership. To this aim we borrow from the recent 
                                                     
13 A recent strand of the literature studies the institutional design of public organizations and the extent to which public officials – 
like regulators and judges - are subject to accountability. Besley and Coate (2003), for the US electric power industry, find that 
the way commissioners are selected - either appointed by the government or elected by citizenry - affects the regulatory 
outcomes: in States where regulators are elected, prices are lower, but investments are also lower than in states where they are 
appointed by the government. This result suggests that being subject to (re-)election makes regulators more inclined to follow 
public opinion than if they were appointed and therefore to pursue short-term rather than long-term goals..  
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literature on political economy and use characteristics of the political, legal and financial institutions to 
instrument potentially endogenous variables. 
3. Two Decades of Regulatory Reforms in the EU  
Until the early Nineties, public utilities in Europe, with the only UK exception, were largely characterized by 
vertical integration, state monopoly and public ownership. Ministries, governmental committees and local 
governments were in charge of the regulatory decisions, setting tariffs and imposing quality standards. In that 
period regulation was viewed more as a sort of "political negotiation" among the utilities and the Ministry 
itself rather than as an instrument to create competitive conditions while amending market failures. 
Regulated rates were mainly set to counterbalance the rise of inflation while utilities were often asked to 
absorb labour units whenever unemployment increased. The result of this “un-incentive regulation” was ill 
performing monopolies and inefficiency (Megginson and Netter, 2001).  
The European Commission issued various Directives to prompt national reforms that redesigned the legal 
and regulatory frameworks in order to raise efficiency, service quality, and spur infrastructure investment 
within EU member states. The public utility sector was therefore gradually liberalized with the involvement 
of private investors in the ownership and control of assets. The Commission, however, though in favour of 
privatisation, left the decision about utilities’ ownership structure entirely in the hands of national 
governments. As of 2010, privatisation of public utilities within EU member states is far from complete, and 
central and local governments still hold majority and minority ownership stakes in many regulated utilities 
(Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009). 
In order to regulate the provision of utility services and to avoid the potential conflict of interest between 
the Government and state owned utilities, the European Commission urged national governments to delegate 
regulatory competencies to independent authorities, entitled to act on the behalf of the central government, 
but outside of any state department or ministry. The new regulatory bodies ought to operate with their own 
specialized staff, with specific and detailed tasks and independently of ministries or government 
departments. The European Commission, however, left to national executives the decision about the 
definition and the scope of the delegated powers. Typically, delegated regulatory tasks involve price setting 
decisions, both at retail and wholesale level - whenever access to essential facility is needed to develop 
market competition -, the definition of entry conditions, the imposition of quality standards and all the 
technical rules to use or access to existing infrastructures. National authorities implemented a variety of 
regulatory mechanisms - ranging from the typical cost-plus (rate of return) to incentive-based schemes - that 
changed over time differently across countries and sectors, so that the inception of the IRA cannot be related 
to the adoption of a specific scheme. Within this set of regulatory rules, utilities are free to make their own 
decisions about investments and their financing. 
To summarize, the implementation of liberalization reforms varies considerably across countries and 
sectors. It is most advanced in the telecom industry where independent regulatory agencies (IRA) have been 
established in virtually all member states and most of the companies are (at least partially) privatised. Market 
liberalization is also quite advanced within the energy sector, where the majority of electric and gas utilities 
is regulated by an IRA. However, many large utilities are still controlled by the government, particularly in 
France, Germany, Italy and Portugal and especially so in the natural gas industry. In contrast, structural 
reforms are lagging behind in water supply and in transportation infrastructure (docks and ports, airports and 
freight motorways). With the exception of the U.K., most water and transportation utilities are still controlled 
by central and local governments and still subject to regulation by ministries or by other branches of the 
government rather than by IRAs.  
4. Estimating Firm Investment with Independent Regulation, Politics and Mixed-Ownership 
In this section we address the identification problems arising when the purpose is to estimate the impact of 
regulatory independence on regulated firms’ investment, while taking government’s (partial) ownership and 
political orientation into account. As explained in the literature review, the theory shows that time 
inconsistency, regulatory lack of commitment and opportunism undermine firm investment incentives. From 
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the empirical point of view, the main challenge is that “lack of commitment”, or the “regulatory 
opportunism”, are not observable and cannot be measured. However, the theory also shows that the 
discipline of regulatory opportunism is expected to alleviate the hold up problem and restore the incentives 
to invest. As the recent regulatory reforms within EU member states suggest, the positive answer to this 
normative problem is the introduction of independent regulatory agencies, with an institutional design that 
should ensure that regulators are insulated from politicians who might undermine their commitment. 
Therefore, ideally, independent regulatory agencies are expected to soften the lack of commitment problem, 
the more so the more independent the regulator is from the government and, if lack of commitment has a 
negative effect on investment, then its discipline should display a positive effect on investment. Our 
empirical strategy is thus to rely on the existence of an independent regulatory agency, or on the degree of 
independence of the agency, to estimate the effect of curbed opportunism on investment. For this reason, 
however, the presence, or the degree of independence, of the IRA, is likely to be endogenous to the 
investment decision, given that the decision to set up an IRA itself is closely related to the lack of 
commitment problem and probably motivated by the intent of disciplining the potential regulatory 
opportunism and so to reassure the firm that investment rents will not be expropriated as soon as investment 
expenditures are sunk. This likely14 endogeneity is an identification problem that we tackle by exploiting 
major institutional features that differ across countries, sectors, and over time as well as by using appropriate 
instrumental variable methods. 
The second challenge we face is the link between politics, the IRA and firm investment, since the 
decision to set up an independent regulatory agency is likely to be political. As long as politics indirectly 
influences public utilities’ investment through the IRA, it provides a suitable instrument for IRA. However, 
politics may also have a direct effect on investment, to the extent that it promotes and mould infrastructure 
investment (think of the decision to set up nuclear or photovoltaic, or wind-power energy plants; to deploy a 
broadband telecom network, to expand the motorway or the railway transportation system, etc.) as well as 
the choice of the technology (labour- or capital-intensive). In our preferred specification, politics enters 
linearly and interactedly with the IRA to test whether the impact of the IRA on investment changes with 
Government’s political orientation.  
Finally, the direct effect of politics on investment decisions is likely to be stronger if the government 
holds ownership stakes in regulated firms, and the larger the stake, the stronger the effect. So our empirical 
models extend to control for the direct vs. indirect effects of politics while also accounting for the presence 
of government, as an investor, in regulated utilities.  
To summarize our econometric methodology, we test the impact of the presence of the IRA on regulated 
utilities’ investment decisions (as said, this may be viewed as the inverse test of the effect of lack of 
commitment), first assuming it is a strictly exogenous variable and subsequently accounting for its potential 
endogeneity by relying on internal (i.e. lags of the IRA) and/or external instruments (e.g. an index of the 
political orientation of the executive in charge). We then account for the direct effect of politics by including 
the political orientation index among the regressors, and, because the effect of the IRA is likely to vary with 
government’s political orientation, we enter these variables linearly and with an interaction. We similarly 
proceed with government’s ownership, first using our ownership variable as an excluded instrument and then 
including it as a regressor, both standalone and interacted with IRA. Because the Government’s decision to 
fully or partly privatise the regulated utilities may also be endogenous to the decision to spur utilities’ 
investments, we allow for endogeneity of this control variable. For robustness, we use alternative sets of 
institutional and political variables both as instruments and as regressors.  
5. Data and Variable Definitions 
For the empirical analysis we use an unbalanced panel of 80 publicly traded utilities and transportation 
infrastructure operators from EU 15 founding member states, tracked from 1994 to 2004. The data covers 
firms that are either regulated by independent regulatory agencies or by ministries, governmental 
                                                     
14 As explained in section 3, the decision to set up independent regulatory authorities was promoted by the European Commission, 
but the timing of the inception and the latitude of the delegated tasks were left to national governments.  
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committees, or local governments, and with various degrees of state ownership. The sample firms operate in 
electricity and natural gas (both distribution and transmission), water supply, telecommunications, freight 
roads concessions, ports, and airports. In all, we have 37 energy utilities, 12 water supply companies, 15 
fixed telecom incumbent operators, 6 freight roads concessionaires, and 10 transportation infrastructure 
operators (airport, ports and docks). Our sample is not large but representative, as it covers more than 85% of 
publicly listed European utilities that in the period 1994-2004 can be tracked for at least five consecutive 
years, as this is what we need to estimate our econometric models.  
Firm level accounting data have been collected from Worldscope. Our dependent variable is the 
investment to capital stock ratio (I/K). In the econometric analysis we use the ratio of capital expenditures to 
capital stock at the replacement value.15 Other key variables of the investment equation are the operating 
cash flow to capital stock ratio (Π/K), the output (real sales) to capital stock ratio (Y/K), and the financial 
debt to capital stock ratio (D/K).  Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in 
the analysis, for the full sample (Panel A), for firm-year observations when the IRA does, and does not exist 
(Panels B and C), for the two sub-sample of firms that, at a point in time, become regulated by an IRA (Panel 
D) and that are never subject to an IRA (Panel E). We notice that the average investment rate for both firm-
year observations under an IRA in panels B and firms that experienced the change and eventually became 
regulated by an IRA in panel D is greater than the mean investment rate of their respective counterparts in 
Panels C and E, though the difference is not large. Figure 1 plots the investment to capital stock rates of the 
two groups of firms behind Panels D and E and we observe that in the initial years (1994-1997) the I/K rate 
for firms never under an IRA was even larger while the investment rate of firms undergoing a change began 
increasing in 1996 and kept growing until 2001, i.e. within the time range in which the IRAs occurred in 
most countries (see Appendix Table A1). After 2001, all firms reduced their investment activity, consistently 
with a generalised slowdown, but investment at firms never under an IRA proceed at a slower pace and 
began to fall much earlier. In Figure 2, we look into the investment activity of firms undergoing the change 
in the regulatory regime before and after the introduction of the IRA. The picture clearly shows that the 
introduction of the IRA brings about an increase in the investment rates compared to one-to-three years 
before the event. Going back to Table 1, we observe that firms, and firm year observations, under an IRA 
tend to have higher leverage, smaller cash flow to capital ratios and lower state shareholding. 
To indicate ownership, we employ a continuous variable constructed by Bortolotti and Faccio (2009), 
which uses the weakest link approach to measure the government’s ultimate control rights (Government 
UCR).16 Within our sample, 21 firms changed their ownership status from state controlled to privately-
controlled (i.e. the government has less than 50% of the ultimate control rights).  
All firms operate in regulated sectors, i.e. where entry and prices are subject to regulatory oversight either 
by a government committee or by a formally Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA). In order to study the 
effect of regulatory independence on firms’ investment decisions, we use an IRA dummy that is equal to 1 in 
all years in which the firm was subject to regulation by an IRA, and 0 otherwise. The IRA dummy was 
constructed using data and information on IRAs’ inception dates taken from Gilardi (2005) for the energy 
and telecommunications sectors. We used additional sources to obtain information about the presence of 
IRAs within freight roads, airports, port and docks, and water supply. We found that only the water industry 
in the UK has an independent regulatory agency. As an alternative to the IRA dummy, we use the Gilardi 
Index of formal Regulatory Independence, which allows us to control for differences in the regulatory 
                                                     
15 The accounting data from Worldscope only include historic cost valuations of fixed assets, which usually bear little relation to 
current replacement cost of long-lived fixed capital assets. Hence, we calculate the replacement cost of the capital stock using the 
perpetual inventory formula: pt+1Kt+1 = ptKt(1-δ)(pt+1/pt) + pt+1It+1, where pt is the country-specific implicit price deflator for gross 
capital formation in period t sourced by the OECD, Kt is the fixed capital stock in period t, It is the investment flow in period t, 
and δ is the depreciation rate. We derived the sector specific depreciation rates from Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates 
reported in “Rates of Depreciation, Service Lives, Declining Balance Rates, and Hulten-Wykoff Categories” and used 4.4% for 
energy, gas and water supply, 3% for freight roads concessionaires, 8% for telecommunications, and 4.5% for ports and airports.  
16 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), Faccio and Lang (2002). According to this approach, the UCR of the state is 
simply equal to the minimum ownership stake along the control chain (i.e., the weakest link).  
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environment across countries and sectors where the IRA exists.17 We focus on formal independence because, 
to our knowledge, no indexes exist that quantitatively measure real independence of European regulators. 
This index is obtained by taking the average of five key dimensions of the regulatory framework: (i) the 
status of the agency head (for example, term of office and appointment and dismissal procedure), (ii) the 
status of the members of management board, (iii) relationship with government and parliament, (iv) financial 
and organizational autonomy, and (v) regulatory competencies. It goes from 0 (no independence) to 1 (full 
independence). The index is time invariant and is not available for water utilities and for transportation 
infrastructures, where the IRA does not exist. Regulatory independence varies considerably across European 
countries and sectors. In telecommunications, Austria, Ireland, Portugal, and the U.K. appear to have the 
most independent regulators, while Belgium and Germany have the least independent regulators. Turning to 
the energy industry, Austria, Belgium, and Italy appear to have the most independent regulators, Spain seems 
to have the least independent regulators while Germany does not have an IRA for energy.  
The Political Orientation Index is a continuous and time-variant measure of the government’s political 
stance, i.e. from leftwing to rightwing, and under reasonable assumptions, can be used to capture whether the 
government in charge is more pro-firm (supposedly right-wing) or pro-consumer (left-wing). The index 
ranges from 0 (extreme left wing) to 10 (extreme right wing) and is equal to a weighted average of scores 
given in expert surveys supporting government (see Huber and Inglehart, 1995, and Bortolotti and Faccio, 
2009). The data in Table 1 show that the average index is 5.662, while the minimum is 3.665 (corresponding 
to the German government led by Gerard Schroeder in the years 2003 and 2004) and the maximum is 8.025 
(assigned to the Italian executive led by Berlusconi from 2002 to 2004), indicating that the distribution of 
observations is more skewed towards the right.18 In Appendix 1 we report, for each country, the political 
orientation of the executives in charge when the IRAs in the energy and telecommunications sectors were 
established. The table shows that IRAs became operative when the government in charge was right-wing or 
center-right in 17 cases out of 28, and in 6 out 28 cases when the government was left-wing or center-left. 
This anecdotal evidence reveals that the pattern of the data is sufficiently heterogeneous, though it seems that 
the IRA is more likely to be set up by conservative governments. It is also true, however, that if IRAs tend to 
be set up in the wake of privatization programs then a hypothetical link “rightwing executive-IRA” may in 
fact conceal a more complex “rightwing executive-privatizations-IRA” link. This is a three-way relation that 
further justifies our choice to adopt an estimation strategy that allows for the interactions of independent 
regulation, mixed-ownership and political orientation.  
In our analysis we allow for the likely endogeneity of the decision to establish an IRA, and of the IRA’s 
degree of formal independence as well as of residual state ownership. We obtain external instruments by 
exploiting country features that help gauging the degree of accountability of domestic institutions, the 
probability that policy reforms and political decisions may be (more or less easily) reverted, and the extent to 
which property rights are effectively protected.  
The Investor Protection index is the “anti-director rights” index developed by La Porta et al. (1999) and 
updated by Pagano and Volpin (2005). The index is time-varying and goes from 0 to 7 as shareholders’ 
rights become more and more protected. We use this variable to proxy for the extent of protection and 
enforcement of property rights. Countries where investors’ and property rights are strongly protected are 
likely to have more credible institutions since, for example, liability rules are clearer, disclosure and 
accountability requirements are tighter, risk of expropriation and likelihood of contract repudiation by the 
government are smaller.  
To control for characteristics of institutional and political systems that may influence the decision to 
privatize utilities and to introduce the IRAs, we use the Political Orientation index (see above) and the 
Political Institutional Gallagher Index of Disproportionality, an index of political fragmentation that allows 
                                                     
17 To our knowledge, Gilardi (2005)’s Index is the only one covering all sectors regulated by an IRA across EU member states. 
Edwards and Waverman (2006) and Larsen et al. (2006) constructed sector- specific indexes that assess the degree of formal 
independence for European countries’ telecommunications and electricity markets, respectively.  
18 As shown by the inter-quartilic distribution of the Political Orientation Index.the first quartile is at 4.43, the median is at 5.27 and 
the third quartile is at 7.44, which indicates a fat tail towards the center-left and a thinner (and longer) tail towards the right wing 
of the political spectrum.  
Carlo Cambini and Laura Rondi 
10 
a categorization of countries based on a majoritarian -consensual dimension and a measure of government 
stability and of the veto-power of minority parties (Gallagher, 1991, updated by Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009). 
The index is continuous and time varying; it equals zero when the apportionment of parliamentary seats is 
exactly proportional to electoral results, and it increases as disproportionality increases toward a majoritarian 
system. As argued in Henisz and Zelner (2001), when political fragmentation is high, policies are adjusted 
less often because reforms are more likely to be blocked within a multi-party system and coalition 
governments, as the number of independent institutional actors with potential veto power increases. This 
implies that within a fragmented political system, politicians are less able to interfere with regulatory 
decisions, and the regulator should be – at least in principle - more independent. 19  
To complement our analysis we also use a set of variables taken from the World Bank database on 
Political Institutions, which has been extensively used in the political economy literature (see Beck et al., 
2001) for a detailed description of the variables in the World Bank database). Here is the list of variables 
used as instruments. The index of Government Stability is a time-varying survey-based measure that assesses 
both the government’s ability to carry out its declared program, and its ability to stay in office. It ranges from 
0 (low stability) to 1 (high stability). Insofar as the executive is more stable and less subject to veto powers, 
lack of commitment and time inconsistency are likely to be less of a problem. EXERLC is a time-varying 
variable equal to 1 when the executive is leftwing, 2 when it is centre, and 3 when it rightwing and can be 
used as an alternative to the index of Political Orientation. Election date is a dummy variable that is equal to 
1 if there was an executive election in that year. Finally, Checks & Balances is a time-varying index that 
measures the number of veto powers in a political system according to specific legislative and executive 
indexes of electoral competitiveness. Table 1(Panel A) reports descriptive statistics for the political and legal 
institutional variables we use in the empirical analysis.  
6. Econometric Model and Estimation Methods  
Company investment decisions are every difficult to model both theoretically and empirically due to the 
problem of controlling for its dynamic component, for expected future profitability and for the natural 
endogeneity of the other firm level variables. The recent microeconometric literature (Bond and Van Reenen, 
2008) has often relied on structural approaches such as the Q model (see, Gugler et al., 2003 and Asker and 
Ljungqvist, 2010 for recent examples) or the Euler equation, introduced by Abel (1980) and developed by 
Bond and Meghir (1994) (see Brown, Fazzari and Petersen, 2009, for a recent application). The Euler 
equation derives from the first-order conditions for the optimal capital stock and therefore describes the 
optimal path of firm investment. It is not an investment rule where investment is a function of predetermined 
or exogenous variables but, rather, a structural relation between investment rates in successive periods as 
derived from dynamic optimization in the presence of symmetric and quadratic adjustment costs that take the 
form of foregone production. The advantage of the Euler equation model is that it captures the influence of 
current expectations of future profitability on current investment decisions without having to rely on stock 
market valuations of the firm as in the usual Q model approach, an attractive feature because, with partially 
privatized, regulated utilities, stock market valuations are likely to be less reliable and lead to larger 
measurement errors.   
To obtain an empirical model, the firm is assumed to maximize the present discounted value of current 
and future net cash flows. Let Lit denote variable factor inputs, wit the price of variable factors, pit 
the price of output, Iit fixed investment, Kit the capital stock, pIit the price of investment goods, ρt+j the nominal discount factor between period t and period t+j, δ the rate of depreciation, F(Kit, 
Lit) the production function and G(Iit, Kit) the adjustment cost function and Et(.) the 
                                                     
19 In fact, while proportional parliamentary regimes lead to multy-party systems and, therefore, to coalition governments, 
majoritarian ones lead to the formation of two-party systems where the executive power is typically concentrated in the hands of 
the prime minister. This implies that, in a system characterized by a unified government, control over bureaucrats will be stronger 
than in systems characterized by a divided government (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1996). Therefore, the probability of observing 
more independent agencies is higher in systems characterized by divided governments (Spiller and Urbiztondo, 1994; Spiller, 
2004). 
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expectation operator conditional on information available at t.20 The firm solves the following optimization 
problem: 
Max Et [Σj=0 ρt+j Π(Kit+j, Lit+j, Iit+j]    (1) 
s.t.  Kit = (1-δ) Kit-1 + Iit 
where Πit = pitF(Kit, Lit) - pitG(Iit, Kit) - witLit - pIitIit. The Euler 
equation characterizing the optimal investment path relates the marginal adjustment costs in adjacent periods 
and can be written as follows:  
- (∂Π/∂I)it = - (1- δ)ρt+1 Et (∂Π/∂I)it+1 +(∂Π/∂K)it  
The symmetric adjustment cost function for the capital stock can be described by G(Iit, Kit) = b/2 
[(I/Kit – c)]2Kit, where b reflects the importance of adjustment costs and c is the "normal" rate 
of gross investment. Since we are dealing with imperfect market structures characterized by non constant 
returns to scale – i.e. natural monopolies or imperfectly competitive markets with dominant firms subject to 
regulatory agencies with the tasks of regulating, among the others, prices, entry and access to the network - 
the output price pit is assumed to depend on the output, with a constant price elasticity of demand ().21 
We therefore introduce the output to capital ratio (Y/K)it to account for imperfect competition in the 
market. 
The Euler equation can then be expressed as:  
(I/K)it - γ1(I/K)2it = γ 2 Et(I/K)it+1 + γ 3[(Ω/K)it – Jit] - γ 
4(Y/K)it + α   (2) 
where Ωit = pitF(Kit, Lit) – pitG(Iit, Kit) – witLit is the gross operating profit and 
Jit is the real user cost of capital (with Jit = (pIit/pit){1- (1-δ)ρt+1pIit+1/ pIit }), 
while the coefficients γ 1, γ 2, γ 3 and γ 4 can be shown to be positive. 
To implement this model, the unobserved Et(I/K)it+1 is replaced by the realized (I/K)it+1 plus 
a forecast error, and the (I/K)it+1 term is then moved to the left-hand side to obtain an econometric 
model that is linear in variables. Finally, the cost of capital term can be replaced by time and firm specific 
effects. Time dummies also control for common macro shocks. The empirical specification that we estimate 
then takes the form:  
(I/K)it+1 = β1(I/K)it - β2(I/K)2it - β3(Π/K)it + β4(Y/K)it + dit+1 + 
ηi+ νit+1  (3) 
                                                     
20 Our concise exposition of the Euler equation approach closely follows Bond and Meghir (1994) and Bond, Elston, Mairesse and 
Mulkay (2003). 
21 This is in line with the so-called Ramsey prices, which represent the second-best solution that a benevolent regulator should 
implement in a regulated setting. According to this pricing rule, prices are inversely related to the degree of demand elasticity.  
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Where Π/K is rate of operating cash flow to capital stock, Y/K is the sales to capital stock ratio, ηi. 
are firm specific effects, dit+1 are the time dummies and νit+1 is the expectational error. 22 It can be 
shown that β1 ≥ 1 and β2≥ 1, while β3 >0 under the null hypothesis of perfect capital markets 
and when internal and external sources of funds are perfect substitutes. The coefficient β4 is positive under 
imperfectly competitive markets or when the company is facing increasing return to scale. In our setting, 
while it is true that utilities typically face non-constant returns to scale, they are also subject to price 
regulation and one goal of regulation is to ensure that the behaviour of public utilities is similar to that of 
firms operating in a competitive environment and that prices are aligned to marginal costs. Moreover, the 
demand of public utility services is typically price inelastic, hence ε < 1. Hence, even though the utilities 
markets are imperfect, the sign of the coefficient β4 might become ambiguous in a regulated setting as the 
two effects might compensate each other. 
As described in Section 4, our main purpose is to investigate the implications of independent regulation 
for the investment policy of regulated firms when residual state ownership and government’s political 
orientation can both influence investment, either indirectly (through the IRA) or directly. We thus augment 
the Euler equation for investment by adding, in turn: the dichotomous IRA dummy which is equal to 1 if 
firm i was subject to regulation by an IRA in year t and is equal to 0 otherwise, Government UCRit, the 
ultimate control rights held by the Government, and the Political Orientation Indexit. The latter two variables 
are used first as external instruments and then included as regressors in the equation, since they are likely to 
display an additional direct effect on investment and would therefore be invalid instruments, leading to 
biased estimates. We therefore estimate the following reduced-form empirical model in which we add, one at 
the time, the institutional variables:  
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We then investigate whether the impact of independent regulation varies with residual state ownership and 
executive’s political orientation, by including the interactions of IRA with Government UCR and with 
Political Orientation and estimating the following reduced-form empirical model: 
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   (5) 
When we estimate the models with the interacted terms, we can calculate, for any given value of Government 
UCR and of Political Orientation, the total effect of the presence of the IRA as ∂(I/K)it/∂IRAit-1 = α1 + α4*Government UCRit-1 + α5*PolOrientit-1, conditional on different patterns of ownership and partisanship. 
The coefficient α1 thus measures the (limit) effect of the IRA on investment as both the Government’s 
shareholding and the Political Orientation indexes go to zero, i.e., the effect of IRA on investment for fully 
privately controlled firms and when the government in charge is (extreme) leftwing. The coefficient α2 
measures the direct effect of state ownership while the coefficient α3 measures the direct effect of political 
orientation of the executive. Finally, the coefficient α4 measures how the effect of IRA varies with 
ownership (from fully private to fully public) while the coefficient α5 measures how the effect of IRA differs 
as political orientation shifts from extreme left to extreme right. The interaction terms Government UCR*IRA 
and Political orientation*IRA thus estimate whether the impact of the IRA on investment is different across 
state- and privately-controlled utilities, and different across utilities under left- and right-wing governments, 
respectively. For all estimated equations, we report the results of tests of significance of the sum of the 
coefficients in order to assess the partial effects of political orientation and state ownership, conditional on 
the presence of the IRA. 
                                                     
22 It is possible to show that β1 = (1+cν)/ψ ; β2 = (1+ν)/2ψ; β3 = μ/bψ , and β4 = (μ -ν)/(bψ), 
where ψ = ρt+1 (1-δ) (pit+1/pit) is treated as constant, μ = (1 – 1/ε) is the mark up coefficient in an 
imperfect market; and ν is the returns to scale of the gross production function. 
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To estimate a dynamic investment equation using panel data, the endogeneity problems affecting both the 
firm level variables in the baseline investment equation and the regulatory independence variables suggest 
that we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) linear generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimator, which is especially designed for models where the lagged dependent variable is 
included and some of the regressors are potentially endogenous. More specifically, we use the dynamic 
System-GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which deals 
with situations where the lagged dependent variable is persistent and the lagged levels of the dependent 
variables are weak instruments. This model estimates a system of level and first-differenced equations and 
uses lags of first-differenced variables as instruments for equations in levels and lags of variables in levels as 
instruments for equations in first-differences.23 In addition to internal instruments, i.e. lags of variables in the 
estimating equation, we use two sets of external instruments, taken from the financial and political 
institutions variables described in Section 5. For the validity of the GMM estimates it is crucial, however, 
that the instruments are exogenous. We therefore report the Arellano and Bond (1991) autocorrelation test to 
control for first-order and second-order correlation in the residuals. In fact, if AR(2) is detected, instruments 
dated t-2 are invalid and only instruments dated t-3 and earlier can be used. Moreover, to test the joint 
validity of the instruments, we calculate the two-step Sargan-Hansen statistic and report the resulting p-
values in all tables. Since the Sargan-Hansen test is robust, but may be weakened if there are too many 
instruments with respect to the number of observations (see, for example, Roodman, 2006), we follow a 
conservative strategy and use no more than three (but mostly two) lags of the instrumenting variables. 
Finally, we test the overidentifying restrictions in the specifications where we experiment with a variety of 
external instruments, and calculate the Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of individual instruments to 
guide our choice of instruments. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary patterns of 
autocorrelations within individuals.  
7. Results 
Tables 2 – 9 report the estimates of the Euler equation models for regulated firms’ optimal capital 
accumulation. In Tables 7, 8 and 9 we present the results of the sensitivity analyses. In Table 7, we test for 
the presence of bankruptcy costs; in Table 8, we replace the IRA dummy with the index of formal 
Regulatory Independence; in Table 9, we account for the impact of market liberalization and competition on 
firm investments.   
7.1 Investigating the Impact of Independent Regulation  
We start in Table 2 with simple OLS regressions with time and firm fixed effects where we report robust 
standard errors clustered at firm level, at sector level, and then at country-sector level because the IRAs were 
set up to address industry specific issues, but then each country implemented it following its own 
institutional rules and procedures. In the next section, we will remove – more plausibly - the exogeneity 
assumptions for the firm variables in the investment model and then proceed by addressing the endogeneity 
of the IRA dummy.  
The fixed effects results in Columns (1) and (2) show that the coefficients on the lagged investment and 
lagged investment squared terms have the right sign and are always significant. The coefficient on the output 
                                                     
23 The system estimator combines the differenced equations with equation in levels, for which the instruments used must be 
orthogonal to the firm-specific effects. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that, in autoregressive models, first differences of the 
series can be uncorrelated with the firm-specific effects provided that the series have stationary means. For this reason, we tested 
the time series properties of our main variables by estimating simple AR(1) specifications using OLS and considering 
conventional t-tests (see also Bond et al. 2003). We report the results in the Appendix Table A2. We find that the unit root 
hypothesis can be rejected for the relevant firm level variables, i.e. the investment, the cash flow and the sales to capital ratios. 
The Table also reports the Within Group (WG), the first-differenced and the system GMM estimates for comparison. As shown 
by Blundell and Bond (1998), in AR(1) models a consistent estimate of the autoregressive parameter is expected to lie in between 
the OLS levels and the WG estimates. Moreover, if the first-differenced GMM and the WG estimates are close this is likely to 
point at a weak instrument problem, and the GMM-System estimator is recommended. This is what we find for all three 
variables.  
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to capital stock ratio is positively signed, but insignificant in all columns. As suggested in Section 6, this is 
probably due to the combined effects of imperfect competition in a regulated environment and inelastic 
demand of public utility services that may compensate each other and lead to an insignificant or even 
negative coefficient. All estimated models, however, show the same inconsistency with one theoretical 
assumption of the Euler investment equation, namely the positive and significant coefficient of the cash flow 
term. Since the cash flow was predicted to have a negative and significant coefficient, this result suggests the 
presence of imperfections in the capital markets such as information asymmetries or incentive problems (see 
Bond and Meghir, 1994, and the literature reviewed by Hubbard, 1998).  
We now turn to our main variable of interest, the IRA dummy. We find that the coefficient on the lagged 
IRA term is positive and significant in all columns. This result indicates that the level of investment is higher 
when an independent regulatory agency exists, consistently with theory showing that regulatory 
independence enhances the investment incentives of regulated utilities (Levy and Spiller, 1994). We then add 
Government UCR to test the hypothesis that state ownership has a direct effect on the investment decisions 
of regulated firms. The direction of this influence, however, is ambiguous because privately-owned utilities 
are thought to have stronger incentives to invest (see, for example, Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987; Martimort, 
2006), but state-owned utilities might be used by politicians to carry out “white elephant” investment 
programs for their own political benefits (see Zelner and Henisz, 2006). Our results reflect this ambiguity, as 
the coefficient on Government UCR is not significantly different from zero.24   
In Columns (3) and (4), we focus on the sub-sample of regulated firms that at some point in time switched 
from forms of government regulation to independent regulation by an Agency, in order to compare their 
investment behaviour before and after they became subject to an IRA. The estimating sample consists of 
energy and telecom utilities for most EU countries as well as the water supply firms in the UK. The 
specifications are the same as in Columns (1)-(2) and, similarly, we report standard errors clustered at the 
firm, sector and country-sector level. The results are unchanged and the coefficients are similar in size and 
significance, the IRA dummy in particular, thus confirming, for European utilities, that the switch to an 
independent regulation regime had a positive effect on their investment decisions.  
7.2 Controlling for Endogeneity of the IRA  
In Section 4 we argued that independent regulatory agencies are likely to be set up because lack of 
commitment due to political interference may undermine investment incentives, a good reason to challenge 
the presumed exogeneity of the IRA. We will consider the indirect influence of politics by including a 
measure of the political orientation of the executive to instrument the IRA dummy and we will then also 
account for the potential endogeneity of both ownership and political orientation. The results are in Table 3. 
In the first two columns of Table 3, we start by reporting the GMM-System estimates of our baseline 
model, where we allow for the potential endogeneity of the firm variables in the investment equation, but not 
of the IRA (nor of firm ownership). That is, we still assume that IRA and Government UCR are exogenous. 
Compared to Table 2, the main difference is that the point estimates of both (I/K) and (I/K)2 are now closer to 
1 in absolute value as the theory predicts, suggesting that the investment dynamics implied by the theory is 
supported by the data (in all columns, the t-tests on the point estimates cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficients are one). The coefficient on the cash flow term is positive but insignificant while, more 
importantly, the IRA dummy is highly significant in both columns. State ownership remains insignificant. 
The robust Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions cannot reject the validity of the instrument set.  
                                                     
24 In the Appendix Table A3, we report the results of three very simple difference-in-difference specifications where the investment 
ratio is regressed on the lagged IRA dummy (Column(1)), on the IRA dummy and Government UCR (Column (2)), and then 
adding the firm level controls (i.e. the lagged investment term, the cash flow and the output to capital ratios). In all regressions 
we include firm and time specific fixed effects and report standard errors which are clustered at the firm, sector and country-
sector level. The results show that estimated coefficient on the IRA dummy is positive and significant in all columns and the firm 
level controls also enter positively and significantly. It is worth noting, however, that Bertrand, Duflo and Mullaithan (2004) 
raise several concerns about the validity of differences-in-differences estimates as obtained by using OLS on panel data, because 
they tend to over-reject the null hypothesis of no effect because of serial correlation problems. In the following, we take care of 
these concerns.  
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However, the decision itself to set up an IRA may interact both with the residual state ownership in the 
public utility and with the executive’s political stance. In the next two Columns, therefore, although the 
Sargan-Hansen test did not detect any problem in Columns (1)-(2), we allow for the potential endogeneity of 
the IRA and then of Government UCR. Columns (3) and (4) report the GMM-SYS estimates, where all 
variables are treated as endogenous and instrumented with their own lags as well as with external variables.25 
Under each column we also report the Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of individual internal and 
external instruments. In Column (3), the instrument set includes the second lags of the IRA variable, and of 
Government UCR (lagged twice, because the (t-1) lag was rejected as an invalid instrument by the 
Difference-in-Hansen test), and Political Orientation. We also add Investor Protection and 
Disproportionality. The former gauges the extent to which the law protects and enforces investors’ rights and 
is meant to proxy for the credibility of domestic institutions. The latter measures the fragmentation of the 
political system, and is meant to seize the power of politicians’ to interfere with the regulator (see Section 5).  
The results show that the IRA dummy enters with a significant coefficient, confirming its positive effect 
on regulated firms’ investment decisions. The Sargan-Hansen test does not reject the validity of the 
instrument set, but recalling that the Diff-in-Hansen test found Government UCRt-1 an invalid instrument, we 
include state ownership in the regression in Column (4). We find that the coefficient of Government UCRt-1 
is positive, suggesting larger investment by state-owned firms, but the p-value is 0.21, hence not significant 
at the conventional levels.  
Finally, in Columns (5) and (6) we re-estimate the same specifications to test for the change in investment 
behaviour within firms that became subject to an IRA, hence excluding firms that did not experienced this 
change. The GMM-System estimates confirm that the switch to an IRA regime does have a positive and 
significant impact on the investment decisions of these firms. We also note that the relevant parameters of 
the Euler-equation investment model for the group of IRA regulated firms are very similar to the full sample, 
i.e. the lagged linear and squared investment terms are significant and of the expected size and sign while the 
cash flow and sales to capital ratios remain insignificant.  
7.3 Introducing Politics and Interacted Effects  
In Table 3, we included the once lagged Government UCR variable due to its rejection as an invalid 
instrument, but then we found that that the estimated coefficient did not reach significance at the 
conventional levels. This suggests that Government UCR might have a direct effect on investment, 
conditional on the presence of the IRA.26 Table 4 explores the interplay between the IRA and firm ownership 
while also extending the analysis to test for the direct impact of the government’s Political Orientation (as 
politicians may be interested in driving large investment programs) and for its interaction with the IRA. If 
one recalls that IRAs in Europe were prompted by the EU Commission to limit political interference on state 
controlled utilities, then the empirical question is whether the impact of residual state ownership and politics 
changes with the presence of the IRA. In other words, the presence of an IRA is expected to capture a 
“more” credible, or “less” opportunistic regulatory environment, but the investment-enhancing impact of the 
IRA might still differ with different levels of state ownership, or depending on the political stance of the 
executive.  
The results support our strategy. In Column (1), the Government UCR*IRA interaction is positively 
signed, suggesting that, when the IRA exists, state-owned firms tend to increase their investment, but neither 
the linear nor the interacted terms are significant. Moreover, the IRA coefficient has turned insignificant (the 
p-value is 0.194), hinting at some misspecification in the identification of relationship between IRA and 
Government ownership. In particular, we notice that Political Orientation is now found to be an invalid 
                                                     
25 GMM estimation of dynamic panel data models is in line with what Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) suggest adopting 
when the main purpose is to identify the effects of specific policy interventions or treatment within a difference-in difference 
approach. They write: “We also hope that our study will contribute in generating further work on alternative estimation methods 
for DD models (such as GLS estimation or GMM estimation of dynamic panel data models) that could be more efficient in the 
presence of serial correlation” (p. 274).  
26 For example, Edwards and Waverman (2006) find, for the EU telecommunication industry, that wholesale charges are higher 
when the public telecom operator (PTO) is state-owned, but decrease when the state-owned PTO is subject to an IRA. 
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instrument, leading us to include it in the regression in Column (2). Here we find that the coefficient on the 
IRA dummy is highly significant again (p-value is 0.03), though both Government UCR and Political 
Orientation are insignificant. Comfortingly, however, the Sargan and the Diff-in-Hansen tests show that 
instruments are valid, both jointly and individually. In Column (3), we add the two interactions. We find that 
the IRA dummy is positive and significant while the Government UCR linear and interacted terms remain 
insignificant. More interestingly, both the standalone Political Orientation variable and its interaction with 
IRA enter significantly and with opposite signs, which suggests that the direct effect of political orientation 
on investment differs conditional on the presence of the IRA. The linear term is positively signed, suggesting 
that regulated firms tend to increase their investment when the executive is rightwing (the Index is high), 
hence, in principle, more market-oriented and pro-firm rather than pro-consumer. In contrast, Political 
Orientation*IRA is negatively signed, indicating that the positive effect of rightwing executives on 
investment shrinks when the IRA exists (or, alternatively, the positive effect of the IRA shrinks when the 
government is very conservative).27  
To further probe the impact of political orientation on investment, in the Appendix Table A5, we focus on 
the sub-sample of firms and sectors that became subject to the IRA, confining the estimation to the years 
when the IRA is in place (i.e. hence there is no interacted term). If the result in Column (3) of Table 4 holds, 
i.e. when the IRA is in place, investments decrease as the executive becomes more and more rightwing, the 
estimated coefficient on political orientation should be significantly negative. This is what we find in 
Column (1) as well as in Column (2), where, as an alternative to the Political Orientation Index, we use 
EXERLC, the discrete partisanship index from the World Bank Political Institutions Database. With both 
variables, the estimated coefficient is negative and significant.  
Because the significant interaction between the IRA dummy and Political orientation hints at negative 
spillovers on regulated firms’ investment, we focus on the marginal effects of IRA and political orientation, 
and report them graphically. While the positive α1 and α3 coefficients imply that firms tend to invest more 
when the IRA exists and when the government is conservative, the negative α5 coefficient suggests that the 
change in investment is less pronounced if the government is rightwing and the IRA is in place. If we test the 
significance of the sums of the coefficients (reported at the bottom of Column (3) in Table 4), we find that 
the sum of α1 + α5 = 0.062 is significantly different from zero while the sum α3 + α5 = - 0.006 is 
insignificantly different from zero. The lack of significance of α3 + α5 is an indication that the presence of 
the IRA curbs the effect of the executive’s political interference (which is per se statistically weaker than the 
effect of the IRA) in the investment decisions of the regulated firms. And this is consistent with the 
expectations of the EU Commission when it spurred governments to set up the independent regulatory 
authorities. However, symmetrically, the significance of the α1 + α5 sum suggests that political interference 
may weaken, and even revert, the positive influence of the IRA when Political Orientation reaches extreme 
values, a result we interpret below.  
To illustrate how the impact of Political Orientation on firm investment varies conditional on the 
presence of the IRA, in Figure 3, we plot the partial effect of the sum: α3 + α5*IRA and the corresponding 
95% confidence intervals based on the estimated coefficients in Column (3). The figure shows that the 
increase in investment experienced by firms under rightwing governments vanishes if the IRA is in place. 
When the IRA dummy is equal to one, the total effect of Political Orientation is summarized by the 
statistically insignificant sum of the point estimates: +0.007 – 0.013 = -0.006, indicating that the effect of the 
IRA offsets the effect of the executive’s political orientation. Figure 4 plots the partial effect of the IRA 
conditional on the executive’s political orientation (i.e. the sum α1 + α5*Political Orientation). We notice 
                                                     
27 To check the robustness of the result on political orientation, we also experimented with specifications including the linear and 
interacted Government UCR terms only in the instrument set and not in the regressions, and we found that the results on Political 
Orientation remain unchanged. We then added industry dummies both as regressors and as instruments, and found that again all 
the results hold. However, we prefer to exclude the industry dummies because the instrument count would outnumber individuals 
in the panel, and this may weaken the Sargan/Hansen test (Roodman, 2006). Results are available on request. Further we re-
estimated the relevant specifications with the first-differenced GMM- estimator, which uses (lags of) variables in levels to 
instrument differenced variables and is therefore less efficient due to the weak instrument problem (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
The results are reported in the Appendix A4 and very similar to those obtained with the GMM-System estimator. In particular the 
IRA dummy is positive and highly significant, the Political Orientation index is positive and not far from significance (the p-
value is 0.135) and the Political Orientation*IRA interaction is negative and significant. 
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that the positive effect of IRA on investment reduces in size as the Political Orientation index increases, i.e. 
as the government becomes increasingly rightwing. If we calculate the impact of IRA at the average value of 
the political orientation index, which is 5.662 (see Table 1), we find that the investment increase is still 
around 1% (0.84%). As the political view of the executives becomes more and more conservative (when the 
index ranges between 0.082/0.013=6.308 and the maximum value 8.025), the effect turns negative.28 
Compared to leftwing governments, rightwing executives are typically viewed as more eager to contain state 
intervention and limit the bureaucrats/regulators intervention in the economy (see Alesina and Rosenthal, 
1995, and Benoit and Laver, 2006). This result thus suggests that under highly conservative governments, the 
conflicts between the objective functions of the regulator and of the rightwing executive is such that the 
institutional and regulatory environment becomes more uncertain and unstable. The diverging goals of 
politicians – on one side - and bureaucrats/regulators – on the other side – may thus generate negative 
spillovers that eventually undermine investment incentives. Apparently, then, our results suggests that IRAs 
succeed in restraining political interference in investment decisions, but only up to a point, that is only if the 
beliefs, or the political views, behind the executive in charge are not in contrast with the institutional 
principles behind the creation of the IRA itself.  
7.4 Further Controls on the Identification of the IRA  
In Section 7.2, we handled the potential endogeneity of independent regulation to utilities’ investment by 
instrumenting the IRA dummy with Investor Protection and Disproportionality and by treating Government 
UCR and Political Orientation first as excluded instruments and then as regressors as well as instruments (to 
be precise, two-years lags of the variables are used as instruments and one-year lags as regressors). In this 
section we check the robustness of our results by using an alternative set of external instruments, which 
captures additional features of the political institutional environment, and at the same time removing the 
internal instruments. The new variables are sourced from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions 
and have been recently used in a similar vein by Pagano and Volpin (2005), Da Rin et al. (2010) and Ticchi 
and Vindigni (2010), among the others. Some of the variables seize the interaction between the IRA and the 
political environment. For example, if the decision to establish the IRA is politically motivated, then the 
Election Date dummy may capture a change in the executive that may have lead to the institution of the IRA. 
Because delegation is thought to be credible only when it cannot be revoked easily and the political system 
constraints executive discretion29, the Checks & Balances Index is used to capture the credibility of 
regulatory independence. Other institutional characteristics are used to proxy or replace the variables in the 
original specification. The time-varying index of Government Stability is another proxy for commitment and 
credibility, while the EXERLC index, which is 1 when the executive is leftwing, 2 when it is centre, and 3 
when it rightwing may be used to instrument the political orientation index. EXERLC varies over time like 
the Political Orientation index, but is less refined in graduating nuances in the partisanship of executives 
(see Section 5 for a detailed description).  
Table 5 reports System-GMM estimates of the investment equation where the external variables described 
above are the only instruments for the IRA dummy (hence no lags of IRA are included as instruments, nor 
the Investor protection and Disproportionality Indexes). In Column (1) of Table 5, the estimated coefficient 
on the IRA dummy is positive and significant and its magnitude is similar to estimates in Table 4. In Column 
(2) we include firm ownership and political orientation, while in Column (3) we add the interacted terms. 
The instrument set does not include the lags of the (institutional) regressors, so no lags of the IRA dummy, 
Government UCR or Political Orientation, but only lagged external variables. Again the results are very 
similar to those in Table 4 and confirm the positive impact of independent regulation on regulated firms’ 
investment and the disciplining of political interference by the IRA.  
                                                     
28 If we match the Political Orientation index values with the executives in charge in that range, we find the Governments led by 
Kohl in Germany, from 1994 to 1997 (the value of the index is 6.69), in Spain by Aznar from 1997 to 2003 (7.5), in the UK by 
John Major in 1994-1996 (7.8); in France by Chirac in 2003-2004 (7.8); in Denmark by Anders Rasmussen since 2002 (7.98), 
and in Italy by Berlusconi from 2002 to 2004 (the maximum value of the index: 8.025). The minimum value, 3.665, is assigned 
to the German executive led by Gerard Schroeder in the period 2002-2004. 
29 This is a quite robust result of the literature on central banks independence; see Keefer and Stasavage (2003). 
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Even though the Sargan and the Diff-in-Hansen tests have never, to this point, rejected the validity of our 
instruments, we perform an additional robustness test of the identifying assumptions (see for example 
Tabellini, 2010) and check the validity of the excluded instruments by including them directly in the 
regressions. If we are correct in excluding them, then they should display no direct effect on investment, and 
the estimated coefficient on IRA ought to remain statistically significant. The results are in Table 6. In 
Columns (1) and (2), we include Investor Protection and Disproportionality and in Columns (3) and (4) we 
include the entire set of World Bank political institutions variables (that we used to instrument IRA in Table 
5).  
The results support our identification strategy. In Columns (1) and (2), Investor Protection and 
Disproportionality are insignificant while the IRA dummy remain highly significant. The World Bank 
variables are also insignificant, except for Government Stability, which enters in Column (3) with a p-value 
of 0.087, but is insignificant in the specification with the interacted terms (Column (4)). Political Orientation 
is positive and significant in Column (2) while its interaction with IRA is negative and significant in both 
Columns (2) and (4). IRA is always positive and significant and the size of the coefficients is similar in all 
columns and also similar throughout the tables.  
7.5 Sensitivity Analysis: Debt Finance, Formal Regulatory Independence and Competition 
An attractive feature of the Euler equation approach is that it can be extended also to debt as a source of 
investment finance (Bond and Meghir, 1994). The model assumes that the rate of interest paid by the firm on 
debt finance may be an increasing function of debt issued, a situation that occurs whenever the firm faces a 
bankruptcy risk, because the probability of bankruptcy is an increasing function of the amount of the debt 
outstanding. This allows us to test for the impact of bankruptcy risk and financial distress on regulated 
utilities’ investment, a feature that Spiegel and Spulber (1994) find to be of key importance if capital 
structure is strategically used to influence regulated rates. After including the institutional variables and the 
usual interacted terms, the augmented Euler equation for capital stock can be written as:  
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where D/K is the financial debt to capital stock ratio. The additional term (D/Kit)2 thus controls for 
the non-separability between investment and financial decisions. The sign on the debt coefficient, β5, is 
expected to be negative if bankruptcy costs exist, and zero if there are no bankruptcy costs and debt and 
investment decisions are separable. The negative coefficient reflects that the expected cost of borrowing is 
not independent of the probability of bankruptcy and also that the probability of bankruptcy decreases as the 
firm size increases for a given level of debt.  
The results are in Table 7. The point estimate of the coefficient on the debt term has the expected negative 
sign and is significant in all columns, suggesting that, also for this sample of regulated firms, the investment 
and financing decisions are not separable due to the presence of deadweight costs associated to bankruptcy. 
This result supports the idea of a strategic use of leverage that, through the bankruptcy threat, may induce the 
regulator to commit to the regulated rates, so as to allow the regulated firm to follow the optimal investment 
path (see BCRS, 2011, for empirical evidence on regulated rates). The remaining results hold, including the 
highly significant coefficient of the IRA dummy.  
The next step is to replace the IRA dummy with the Formal Regulatory Independence Index (Gilardi, 
2005), which graduates the formal level of regulatory independence from 0 (no independence) to 1 (full 
independence). Results are in Table 8. Although the index is time invariant, by using a continuous variable 
we can account for differing levels of regulatory independence across countries and sectors in which an IRA 
exists. This test allows us to investigate the effect that varying degrees of regulatory independence have on 
the sub-sample of firms that are actually subject to an IRA, e.g. the energy and telecommunications 
industries in most countries and, for the UK only, water supply. The results confirm the positive effect of 
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regulatory independence on investment and the negative externality of political interference. The coefficient 
on the Regulatory Independence Index is positive and significant in all columns, suggesting that the higher 
the formal regulatory independence the higher the investment. In Column (3), when we include the interacted 
term, the coefficient on the linear Political Orientation variable turns positive and significant while its 
interaction with the Regulatory Independence Index is significantly negative. The main difference with 
previous results is that Government UCR now enters significantly. The negative α2 coefficient on the linear 
term indicates that the larger the Government’s stake the lower the investment rate, but the positive α4 
coefficient on the interaction suggests that the effect of Regulatory Independence is to increase state-owned 
utilities’ investment. Overall, the test which applies the index of Regulatory Independence to firms subject to 
IRA yields results consistent with those obtained when we used the IRA dichotomous dummy for the full 
sample.   
Last but not least, we control for the effect of the increasing market competition that is expected to follow 
the product market reforms of the past decades. To capture the pace and intensity of liberalization and 
deregulation reforms in a variety of sectors and countries, we use an index sourced from the OECD 
International Regulation database by Conway and Nicoletti (2006). The index is an average of several 
indicators which vary from 0 to 6 (lower numbers indicate a greater degree of openness) and reflects entry 
barriers,30 the vertical structure of the market, the state ownership in firms that operate in the relevant sector, 
the market share of the dominant player(s), and the presence of regulatory controls on retail prices and 
specific guidelines for its implementation. We eliminate the state ownership component from the index, 
because we already have a well-defined ownership variable, and recalculate the average over the remaining 
OECD sub-indicators (market entry, vertical integration and market structure). As in the original OECD 
index, high values of the index are associated with low degrees of liberalization. In Table 9, we thus add the 
new variable, OECD Liberalization Index, to the usual specification with the IRA dummy in Column (1). In 
Column (2) we test its interaction with IRA, and in Column (3) we include Government UCR and Political 
Orientation, and test the robustness of the Political Orientation*IRA interaction. Notably, the index does not 
exist for infrastructure industries such as ports and airports, and water supply, so we run the regressions for 
the subsample of firms operating in energy, telecoms, and freight roads.  
The results in Columns (1) and (2) show that the coefficient of OECD Liberalization Index is 
insignificant, but when we include Political Orientation to allow for the political stance of the government, 
in Column (3), we find that the estimated coefficient on the Liberalization Index is almost significant (the p-
value is 0.117) and negatively signed, suggesting that as long as liberalization makes progress and markets 
become more open and competitive, regulated firms increase their investments. This result is consistent with 
Alesina et al. (2005) who, using the above indexes, find that deregulation and liberalization spur investment 
in non-manufacturing sectors in OECD countries. Furthermore, in that the OECD Liberalization Index 
approaches significance only when we account for the government’s political orientation, our results are in 
line with Duso and Seldeslachts (2010) and Potrafke (2010), who find that political partisanship is a driving 
force of product market deregulation within OECD countries. Comfortingly, both the IRA dummy and its 
interaction with Political Orientation remain highly significant, confirming that our main results are robust 
when we control for the intensity of market liberalization.  
8. Conclusions and Implications 
Over the last 20 years, in most European countries, regulatory competencies have been delegated to 
independent authorities mainly to reduce potential conflicts of interests that surface when politicians directly 
or indirectly control companies providing essential services for citizens. The expectation was that this new 
institutional arrangement would enhance the credibility of the regulatory commitments and positively affect 
public utilities’ investment spending.  Notwithstanding IRAs, politicians can still influence the regulatory 
policy to pursue their partisan interests, and government intervention might especially intensify when 
utilities are (totally or partially) controlled by the State and market liberalization is incomplete. Regulatory 
                                                     
30 Low values of the entry barriers indicators are associated with competition in all segments of the relevant sector as well as with 
vertical separation between downstream and upstream firms. High values are associated with the existence of a vertically 
integrated legal monopoly. 
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independence, government’s political orientation and residual state ownership are thus institutional features 
that, separately and interactedly, may affect investment spending in the public utility sector, which is 
acknowledged as a driving force of economic growth.  
This paper investigates the investment decisions of a large panel of publicly traded European regulated 
firms from 1994 to 2004, taking the changing institutional environment into account, namely: (i) varying 
degrees of independence of regulatory agencies across different sectors; (ii) varying degrees of state 
ownership within regulated public utilities, and (iii) the government’s political orientation, in that executives 
may ultimately influence the regulatory climate to be either pro-firm or pro-consumers. Motivated by the 
recent strand of applied political economy literature, we address the potential endogeneity of these 
institutional variables and rely on instrumental variables techniques and alternative sets of instruments to 
identify the direction of the relationship between investment, independent regulation and politics. 
Our results show that when an Independent Regulatory Agency is in place, or when the regulator is more 
independent, investment does increase. This evidence implies that the gradual introduction of modern 
regulatory governance in Europe contributes to a more credible and stable environment that, as predicted by 
the theory, strengthens the regulated firms’ investment incentives and generates positive effects on the 
economy as a whole.  
As regulatory reforms were implemented in Europe, however, firm privatisation and market liberalization 
were also in progress. Our findings do not support a significant difference between the investment of 
privately controlled and partially privatised utilities, showing instead that market liberalization, after 
controlling for the presence of the IRA and for government political orientation, has a positive influence on 
regulated firms’ investment. 
Finally, our results show that politics still affect firm behaviour. Delegation to bureaucrats –to IRAs in 
our case - is preferable, from the normative point of view, when time inconsistency and short-termism may 
influence the decision process, or if vested interests have large stakes in the policy outcomes, as in the case 
of regulated utilities. However, from the positive point of view, politicians may not be willing to fully 
delegate policy powers to bureaucrats (Alesina and Tabellini, 2008). Incomplete delegation thus implies that 
a formally independent regulatory authority might not per se be the sufficient condition to create a more 
stable, less opportunistic regulatory environment, as long as politicians wish to retain some policy tools that 
they may use to make their re-election more likely (political rent-seeking) even at the cost of making the 
regulatory environment less stable and more uncertain. What are the implications for investment?  
Our results shows that both formal regulatory independence and (rightwing) political orientation of the 
executive have a positive effect on investment, but also that the interaction between the two is negative, 
suggesting a negative spillover for high values of the index. Our interpretation of this negative spillover is 
that a conflict of policy objectives may arise whenever a formally independent regulator coexists with an 
executive at the extreme right of the political spectrum. This conflict would re-introduce instability and 
uncertainty in the regulatory framework and ultimately undermine the investment incentives of regulated 
firms.  
Entering the black box of the relationship between regulators and politicians, while controlling for the 
direct government’s ownership of the firm, is surely an interesting political economy question that deserves 
further empirical analyses. 
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Table 1 - Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max No. Obs. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
      
Real Sales (in millions of 2005 dollars) 96,876.18  148,345.30 79.87 802,264.60  720 
Real Total Asset (in mills. of 2005 dollars) 207,465.30 320,829.70 297.02  1,562,157 720 
Investment Rate  0.111 0.072 0.000 0.674 703 
Cash flow to Capital Stock 0.135 0.102 - 0.940 0.871 719 
Sales to Capital Stock 0.742 0.804 0.020 6.191 684 
Debt-to-Capital Stock 0.212 0.304 0.000 3.356 719 
Independence Regulatory Agency dummy 0.585 0.493 0 1 720 
Index of Regulatory Independence  0.618 0.114 0.36 0.83 421 
Government’s UCR 0.344 0.357 0 1 720 
Political Orientation 5.662 1.481 3.665 8.025 720 
Investor Protection 3.826 1.216 1 5 720 
Disproportionality Index 10.527 8.222 0.428 33.739 720 
Government Stability 0.156 0.320 0 1 720 
EXERLC 1.960 0.942 1 3 720 
Election Date 0.029 0.168 0 1 720 
Checks & Balances 3.874 0.975 2 7 720 
OECD Liberalization Index 2.708 2.042 0 6 521 
Panel B: Firm-year observations under an IRA  
      
Real Sales (in millions of 2005 dollars) 93,213.56 133,725.90 355.70 802,264.60 421 
Real Total Asset (in millions of 2005 dollars)  207,363.90 301,776.60 1,084.65 1,553,495 421 
Investment Rate  0.114 0.071 0.008 0.673 408 
Cash flow to Capital Stock 0.133 0.098 - 0.940 0.498 420 
Sales to Capital Stock 0.730 0.863 0.020 6.191 403 
Debt-to-Capital Stock 0.237 0.343 0.000 3.356 420 
Government’s UCR 0.285 0.341 0 1 421 
Panel C: Firm-year observations without an IRA 
      
Real Sales (in millions of 2005 dollars) 102,033.30 166,872.60 79.869 752,871.10 299 
Real Total Asset (in millions of 2005 dollars) 207,608.20 346,404.50 297.017 1,562,157 299 
Investment Rate  0.107 0.073 0.000 0.537 295 
Cash flow to Capital Stock 0.138 0.107 - 0.561 0.871 299 
Sales to Capital Stock 0.758 0.709 0.093 4.670 281 
Debt-to-Capital Stock 0.177 0.234 0.000 1.847 299 
Government’s UCR 0.402 0.368 0 1 299 
Panel D: IRA regulated firms (before and after shifting to an IRA regime)  
      
Investment Rate  0.114 0.068 0.006 0.674 489 
Cash flow to Capital Stock 0.133 0.106 -0.939 0.498 502 
Sales to Capital Stock 0.723 0.823 0.020 6.191 473 
Debt-to-Capital Stock 0.239 0.338 0 3.356 502 
Government’s UCR 0.321 0.353 0 1 503 
Panel E: Regulated firms never under an IRA 
      
Investment Rate  0.105 0.080 0.000 0.536 214 
Cash flow to Capital Stock 0.141 0.094 0.016 0.871 217 
Sales to Capital Stock 0.783 0.758 0.093 4.670 211 
Debt-to-Capital Stock 0.149 0.190 0 1.154 217 
Government’s UCR 0.362 0.365 0 1 217 
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Table 2 – Investment Euler-Equation with Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA) dummy and 
Government’s Ownership: Within Groups Estimates 
I/Kt 
Full Sample 
Sub-sample of Firms under IRA  
(before and after the IRA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(I/K)t-1 0.601 0.600 0.573 0.574 
 (0.095) *** (0.095) *** (0.134)*** (0.134)*** 
 (0.056)*** (0.058)*** (0.055)*** (0.057)*** 
 [0.128]*** [0.128]*** [0.188]*** [0.186]*** 
(I/K)2t-1 -0.767 -0.765 -0.874 -0.876 
 (0.181) *** (0.181) *** (0.199)*** (0.198)*** 
 (0.165)*** (0.171)*** (0.189)** (0.194)** 
 [0.198]*** [0.198]*** [0.240]*** [0.233]*** 
(Π/K)t-1 0.113 0.113 0.083 0.083 
 (0.051) ** (0.051) ** (0.042)* (0.043)* 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.067) (0.068) 
 [0.053]** [0.053]** [0.043]* [0.043]* 
(Y/K)t-1 0.012 0.012 -0.10 -0.010 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.016] [0.017] 
IRA Dummyt-1 (α1) 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.022 
 (0.010) ** (0.010) ** (0.011)** (0.010) ** 
 (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
 [0.011]* [0.011]* [0.012]* [0.012]* 
Government UCR t-1 (α2) - 0.006 - -0.002 
 - (0.016) - (0.023) 
 - (0.015) - (0.015) 
 - [0.014] - [0.019] 
 - - - - 
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R squared within 0.242 0.243 0.195 0.195 
F-test (p-value) 12.93 (0.00) 12.11 (0.00) 16.06 (0.00) 15.46 (0.00) 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 80[582] 80[582] 55[400] 55[400] 
 
Notes. Fixed effects estimates. The dependent variable (I/K) is the investment rate measured as the ratio 
between capital expenditures and capital stock at replacement value. П/K is the ratio between operational 
cash flow and the capital stock at replacement value. Y/K is the sales to capital stock (at replacement 
value) ratio. IRA is a dummy equal to 1 if an independent regulatory agency (IRA) is in place and equal to 
0 otherwise. Government’s UCR measures the ultimate control rights held by the government. All 
regressions include year dummies both as regressors and as instruments. Standard errors in parentheses 
are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation, that is clustered at firm, sector and 
country&sector level, respectively. ***, **, * denote significance of the coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
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Table 3 – Investment Euler-Equation with IRA and Government’s Ownership: GMM-System Estimates 
 Exogenous IRA and Government’s Ownership Endogenous IRA and Government’s Ownership 
I/Kt Full Sample Full Sample 
Sub-sample of Firms 
under IRA       (before 
and after the IRA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(I/K)t-1 0.910*** 0.904*** 0.972*** 0.961*** 0.854*** 0.855*** 
 (0.148) (0.147) (0.118) (0.118) (0.125) (0.126) 
(I/K)2t-1 -1.021*** -1.021*** -1.205*** -1.199*** -1.071*** -1.084*** 
 (0.249) (0.247) (0.168 (0.168) (0.190) (0.147) 
(Π/K)t-1 0.037 0.036 -0.015 -0.017 0.041 0.035 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.075) (0.074) 
(Y/K)t-1 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
IRA Dummyt-1 (α1) 0.009** 0.010** 0.012* 0.013** 0.025** 0.028** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) 
Government UCR t-1 (α2) - 0.008 - 0.009 - 0.009 
 - (0.006) - (0.007) - (0.010) 
       
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.020 0.018 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.624 0.618 0.86 0.855 0.988 0.974 
       
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 0.366 0.321 0.363 0.246 0.537 0.695 
Internal Instruments   Difference-in-Hansen tests (p-value) 
IRA Dummyt-2 - - 0.136 0.213 0.291 0.606 
Government UCR t-2 - - - 0.216 - 0.992 
External and Excluded Instruments 
- - 
    
Government UCR  - - 0.573 - 0.095 - 
Political Orientation  - - 0.957 0.891 0.550 0.363 
IP - Investor Protection - - 0.819 0.937 - - 
D – Disproportionality - - 0.461 0.278 - - 
       
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 80[582] 80[582] 80[521] 80[521] 53[288] 53[288] 
  
Notes. Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM estimates in columns (1)-(6). The dependent variable 
(I/K) is the investment rate measured as the ratio between capital expenditures and capital stock at replacement value. 
П/K is the ratio between operational cash flow and the capital stock at replacement value. Y/K is the sales to capital 
stock (at replacement value) ratio. IRA is a dummy equal to 1 if an independent regulatory agency (IRA) is in place and 
equal to 0 otherwise. Government’s UCR measures the ultimate control rights held by the government. Political 
orientation measures the government’s political stance. Investor Protection and Disproportionality Indexes are defined 
in Section 5. All regressions include year dummies both as regressors and as instruments. Standard errors in parentheses 
are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. AR(1) [AR(2)] tests the null hypothesis of no 
first-order [second-order] correlation in the differenced residuals. The Sargan-Hansen statistic tests the null hypothesis 
that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote significance of the coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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Table 4 –Introducing Politics and Interacted Effects with the IRA 
I/Kt (1) (2) (3) 
(I/K)t-1 0.866*** 0.958*** 0.961*** 
 (0.132) (0.119) (0.119) 
(I/K)2t-1 -1.060*** -1.193*** -1.210*** 
 (0.190) (0.169) (0.170) 
(Π/K)t-1 -0.036 -0.016 -0.006 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.029) 
(Y/K)t-1 0.005 0.004 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
IRA Dummyt-1 (α1) 0.010 0.013** 0.082** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.033) 
Government UCR t-1 (α2) -0.005 0.009 0.007 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
Political Orientation t-1 (α3) - -0.001 0.007* 
 - (0.003) (0.004) 
Government UCR t-1*IRA (α4) 0.025 - 0.006 
 (0.021) - (0.019) 
Political Orientation t-1*IRA (α5) - - -0.013** 
 - - (0.006) 
    
P-value test on α1 + α4 = 0 0.056  0.014 
P-value test on α1 + α5 = 0 -  0.008 
P-value test on α3 + α5 = 0 -  0.166 
    
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.004 0.004 0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.836 0.864 0.993 
    
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 0.309 0.233 0.223 
Internal Instruments Difference-in-Hansen tests (p-value) 
IRA Dummyt-2 0.521 0.317 0.852 
Government UCR t-2 0.698 0.295 0.588 
Political Orientation (t-2)  - 0.246 0.440 
External and Excluded Instruments 
   
Government UCR  - - - 
Political Orientation  0.065 - - 
IP - Investor Protection 0.912 0.789 0.587 
D – Disproportionality 0.903 0.372 0.162 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 80[521] 80[521] 80[521] 
 
Notes. Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM estimates. (I/K), (П/K), (Y/K), IRA dummy, 
Government’s UCR and Political orientation are defined as in Table 2. All regressions include year 
dummies both as regressors and as instruments. Investor Protection and Disproportionality Indexes are 
defined in Section 5. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group 
serial correlation. AR(1) [AR(2)] tests the null hypothesis of no first-order [second-order] correlation in 
the differenced residuals. The Sargan-Hansen statistic tests the null hypothesis that the over-identifying 
restrictions are valid. The Difference-in-Hansen statistics tests the exogeneity of subsets or individual 
instruments. ***, **, * denote significance of the coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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Table 5 –Investment Equation with Political Institution Variables as External Instruments 
I/Kt (1) (2) (3) 
(I/K)t-1 0.942*** 0.926*** 0.915*** 
 (0.127) (0.127) (0.125) 
(I/K)2t-1 -1.154*** -1.141*** -1.161*** 
 (0.180) (0.181) (0.186) 
(Π/K)t-1 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.029) 
(Y/K)t-1 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
IRA Dummyt-1 (α1) 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.120** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.052) 
Government UCR t-1 (α2) - 0.009 -0.011 
 - (0.006) (0.011) 
Political Orientation t-1 (α3) - -0.002 0.010* 
 - (0.002) (0.006) 
Government UCR t-1* IRA (α4) - - 0.039* 
 - - (0.022) 
Political Orientation t-1* IRA (α5) - - -0.021** 
 - - (0.009) 
    
P-value test on α1 + α4 = 0 - - 0.003 
P-value test on α2 + α4 = 0 - - 0.041 
P-value test on α1 + α5 = 0 - - 0.021 
P-value test on α3 + α5 = 0 - - 0.007 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.004 0.004 0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.835 0.852 0.819 
    
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 0.516[71] 0.445[69] 0.296[65] 
 Difference-in-Hansen tests (p-value) 
External and Excluded Instruments    
Government UCR t-2 0.840 - - 
Political Orientation t-2 0.230 - - 
WB Political Institutions 0.907 0.571 0.903 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 80 [521] 80 [521] 80 [521] 
 
Notes. Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM estimates. (I/K), (П/K), (Y/K), IRA dummy, Government’s UCR 
and Political orientation are defined as in Table 2. All regressions include year dummies both as regressors and as instruments. 
Government UCR t-1*IRA and Political Orientation t-1*IRA are instrumented with Government UCRt-2*Government Stabilityt-2 and 
EXERLCt-2* Government Stabilityt-2, respectively. The WB Political Institutions instruments include: Government Stability, 
Checks & Balances, Election Date, and EXERLC, as defined in Section 5. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to 
heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. AR(1) [AR(2)] tests the null hypothesis of no first-order [second-order] 
correlation in the differenced residuals. The Sargan-Hansen statistic tests the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions 
are valid. The Difference-in-Hansen statistics tests the exogeneity of subsets or individual instruments. ***, **, * denote 
significance of the coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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Table 6 –Further Checks on the Validity of External Instruments 
I/Kt (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(I/K)t-1 0.965*** 0.963*** 0.997*** 0.947*** 
 (0.118) (0.114) (0.130) (0.138) 
(I/K)2t-1 -1.212*** -1.221*** -1.250*** -1.189*** 
 (0.172) (0.169) (0.183) (0.203) 
(Π/K)t-1 -0.006 0.001 -0.011 -0.004 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.033) (0.031) 
(Y/K)t-1 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
IRA Dummyt-1 (α1) 0.013** 0.076** 0.014** 0.073** 
 (0.006) (0.030) (0.007) (0.033) 
Government UCR t-1 (α2) 0.012 0.008 0.005 -0.007 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) 
Political Orientation t-1 (α3) 0.000 0.008** -0.006 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Government UCR t-1* IRA (α4) - 0.010 - 0.021 
 - (0.019) - (0.020) 
Political Orientation t-1* IRA (α5) - -0.012** - -0.012** 
 - (0.005) - (0.006) 
Investor Protection t-1 0.0005 0.0003 - - 
 (0.003) (0.003) - - 
Disproportionality t-1 0.0003 0.0002 - - 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) - - 
Government Stability t-1 - - 0.014* 0.011 
 - - (0.008) (0.008) 
EXERLC t-1 - - 0.007 0.009 
 - - (0.005) (0.007) 
Checks & Balance t-1 - - 0.007 0.002 
 - - (0.002) (0.003) 
Election Date t-1 - - -0.009 -0.009 
 - - (0.09) (0.009) 
P-value test on α1 + α4 = 0 - 0.014 - 0.014 
P-value test on α1 + α5 = 0 - 0.011 - 0.025 
P-value test on α3 + α5 = 0 - 0.226 - 0.067 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.871 0.998 0.849 0.677 
     
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 0.201[64] 0.325[65] 0.459[64] 0.359 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 80 [521] 80 [521] 80[521] 80[521] 
Notes. Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM estimates. (I/K), (П/K), (Y/K), IRA dummy, 
Government’s UCR and Political orientation are defined as in Table 2. All regressions include year dummies both as 
regressors and as instruments. Investor Protection, Disproportionality, Election Date, Government Stability and 
EXERLC are defined in Section 5. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group 
serial correlation. AR(1) [AR(2)] tests the null hypothesis of no first-order [second-order] correlation in the differenced 
residuals. The Sargan-Hansen statistic tests the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. The 
Difference-in-Hansen statistics tests the exogeneity of subsets or individual instruments.  ***, **, * denote significance 
of the coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
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Table 7 –Investment Equation with Debt Finance 
I/Kt (1) (2) (3) 
(I/K)t-1 0.939*** 0.933*** 0.944*** 
 (0.117) (0.118) (0.117) 
(I/K)2t-1 -1.142*** -1.143*** -1.171*** 
 (0.157) (0.161) (0.163) 
(Π/K)t-1 0.003 - 0.005 -0.004 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.038) 
(Y/K)t-1 0.005 0.005 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
(Debt/K)2t-1 -0.005*** -0.004*** - 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
IRA Dummyt-1 (α1) 0.012** 0.015** 0.081** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.035) 
Government UCR t-1 (α2) - 0.008 0.011 
 - (0.008) (0.011) 
Political Orientation t-1 (α3) - -0.001 0.007* 
 - (0.003) (0.004) 
Government UCR t-1* IRA (α4) - - -0.001 
 - - (0.018) 
Political Orientation t-1* IRA (α5) - - -0.012* 
 - - (0.006) 
P-value test on α1 + α4 = 0 - - 0.018 
P-value test on α1 + α5 = 0 - - 0.017 
P-value test on α3 + α5 = 0 - - 0.192 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.757 0.771 0.868 
    
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 0.304[67] 0.226[65] 0.202[65] 
Internal Instruments 
Difference-in-Hansen tests (p-value) 
IRA Dummyt-2 0.630 0.479 0.181 
Government UCR t-2 - 0.771 0.208 
Political Orientation (t-2)  - 0.336 0.276 
External and Excluded Instruments    
Government UCR  0.707 - - 
Political Orientation  0.693 - - 
IP - Investor Protection 0.227 0442 0.328 
D - Disproportionality 0.958 0.933 0.759 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 80[521] 80[521] 80[521] 
Notes. Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM estimates. (I/K), (П/K), (Y/K) IRA dummy, 
Government’s UCR and Political orientation are defined as in Table 2. (D/K) is the ratio of financial debt to capital 
stock at replacement value. All regressions include year dummies both as regressors and as instruments. Investor 
Protection and Disproportionality are defined in Section 5. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to 
heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. AR(1) [AR(2)] tests the null hypothesis of no first-order 
[second-order] correlation in the differenced residuals. The Sargan-Hansen statistic tests the null hypothesis that the 
over-identifying restrictions are valid. The Difference-in-Hansen statistic tests the exogeneity of subsets or individual 
instruments. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
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Table 8 –Investment Equation with Formal Regulatory Independence Index 
I/Kt (1) (2) (3) 
(I/K)t-1 0.753*** 0.742*** 0.735*** 
 (0.131) (0.146) (0.135) 
(I/K)2t-1 -0.906*** -0.930*** -0.903*** 
 (0.180) (0.200) (0.179) 
(Π/K)t-1 0.091 -0.036 0.204** 
 (0.075) (0.067) (0.103) 
(Y/K)t-1 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Regulatory Independence Indext-1 (α1) 0.060* 0.161** 0.370** 
 (0.037) (0.068) (0.182) 
Government UCR t-1 (α2) - -0.005 -0.158** 
 - (0.014) (0.079) 
Political Orientation t-1 (α3) - -0.003 0.038** 
 - (0.005) (0.017) 
Government UCR t-1* Regulatory Independence (α4) - - 0.275** 
 - - (0.135) 
Political Orientation t-1* Regulatory Independence (α5) - - -0.072** 
 - - (0.031) 
    
P-value test on α1 + α4 = 0 - - 0.008 
P-value test on α2 + α4 = 0 - - 0.041 
P-value test on α1 + α5 = 0 -  0.049 
P-value test on α3 + α5 = 0 -  0.028 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.033 0.024 0.031 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.622 0.944 0.339 
    
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 0.453[40] 0.615[43] 0.548[31] 
Internal Instruments 
Difference-in-Hansen tests (p-value) 
Regulatory Independence Indext-2 0.15  0.525 0.274 
Government UCR t-2 - 0.712 0.428 
Political Orientation t-2  - 0.752 0.147 
External and Excluded Instruments    
IP - Investor Protection 0.752 - - 
D- Disproportionality - 0.149 0.119 
    
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 53[261] 53[261] 53[261] 
Notes. Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM estimates. (I/K), (П/K), (Y/K) IRA dummy, Government’s UCR 
and Political orientation are defined as in Table 2. Regulatory Independence is an index of formal regulatory independence 
(Gilardi, 2005). All regressions include year dummies both as regressors and as instruments. Investor Protection and 
Disproportionality are defined in Section 5. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group 
serial correlation. AR(1) [AR(2)] tests the null hypothesis of no first-order [second-order] correlation in the differenced residuals. 
The Sargan-Hansen statistic tests the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. The Difference-in-Hansen 
statistics tests the exogeneity of subsets or individual instruments. ***, **, * denote significance of the coefficients at 1%, 5% 
and 10%. 
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Table 9 – Investment Equation with Competition Effects 
I/Kt (1) (2) (3) 
(I/K)t-1 0.822*** 0.800*** 0.758*** 
 (0.084) (0.095) (0.111) 
(I/K)2t-1 -1.021*** -0.989*** -0.954*** 
 (0.137) (0.149) (0.146) 
(Π/K)t-1 0.138** 0.138** 0.165** 
 (0.063) (0.064) (0.084) 
(Y/K)t-1 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
IRA Dummyt-1 0.019** 0.020* 0.132** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.056) 
OECD Liberalization Index t-1 0.001 -0.0003 -0.0061 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
OECD Liberalization Index t-1* IRA - 0.0001 - 0.0001 
 - (0.004) (0.004) 
Political Orientation t-1  - - 0.013 
 - - (0.008) 
Government UCR t-1 - - 0.016 
 - - (0.013) 
Political Orientation t-1* IRA  - - -0.021** 
 - - (0.009) 
    
    
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.025 0.024 0.021 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.492 0.499 0.245 
    
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 0.441 [48] 0.400 [34] 0.609 [35] 
Internal Instruments 
Difference-in-Hansen tests (p-value) 
IRA Dummyt-2 0.728 0.891 0.732 
OECD Liberalization Index t-2 0.785 0.574 0.213 
Government UCR t-2 - - 0.569 
Political Orientation t-2  - - 0.501 
External Instruments 
 
 
 
IP - Investor Protection 0.950 0.749 0.298 
D- Disproportionality 0.655 0.491 0.956 
    
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 57[307] 57[307] 57[307] 
Notes. Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM estimates. (I/K), (П/K), (Y/K), IRA dummy, Government’s 
UCR and Political orientation are defined in Table 2. The OECD Liberalization Index is a revised version of the OECD 
Index of Product Market Regulation by Conway and Nicoletti (2006). All regressions include year dummies. Investor 
Protection and Disproportionality are defined in Section 5. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to 
heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. AR(1) [AR(2)] tests the null hypothesis of no first-order 
[second-order] correlation in the differenced residuals. The Sargan-Hansen statistic tests the null hypothesis that the 
over-identifying restrictions are valid. The Difference-in-Hansen statistics tests the exogeneity of subsets or individual 
instruments. ***, **, * denote significance of the coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
                                                     
1 P-value = 0.117 
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Figure 1 – Investment Rate at Firms Under an IRA and at Firms Never Under an IRA. 
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Figure 2 – Investment Rate at the IRA Inception, Before the Event and After the Event  
(sub-sample of firms undergoing the change in regulatory regime) 
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Figure 3 - Marginal Effect of Political Orientation on IK as the IRA is Set in Place 
Marginal Effect of Political Orientation on IK  as IRA is set in place  (95% confidence intervals)
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Figure 4 - Marginal Effect of IRA on IK as Political Orientation Shifts From Left to Right2 
Marginal Effect of IRA on IK  as Political Orientation changes (95% confidence intervals)
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2 We report values only for the range of variation of the Political Orientation variable, i.e. [3.665 – 8.025]. Note that the 80% of 
observations belongs to the range [4 – 7.71].  
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Appendix A1  
Establishment of an Independent Authority and Government’s Political Orientation 
 Energy 
 
Telecom 
Country Date of 
establishing 
an energy 
IRA 
Leading Party/Coalition and political 
orientation of the Government when 
the IRA is established 
Date of 
establishing a 
Telecom IRA 
Leading Party/Coalition and political 
orientation of the Government when 
the IRA is established 
Austria 2000 
Social Democratic Party run by Franz 
Vranitzky 
 
Executive Or.: Right  
1997 
Social Democratic Party run by Franz 
Vranitzky 
 
Executive Or.: Right 
Belgium 1999 
Dutch Christian Social Coalition run by 
Jean-Luc Dehaene 
 
Executive Or.: Center 
1991 
Dutch Christian Social Coalit run by 
Wilfred Martens 
 
Executive Or.: Center 
Denmark 1999 
Social Democratic Party run by Poul 
Nyrup Rasmussen 
 
Executive Or.:Left 
2002 
Liberal Party of Denmark run by Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen 
 
Executive Or.: Right 
Finland 1995 
Centre Party run by Esko Aho 
 
Executive Or.: Center/Right 1987 
Social Democratic Party run by Kalevi 
Sorsa 
 
Executive Or.: Center/Right 
France 2000 
Socialist Party run by Lionel Jospin 
 
Executive Or.: Left  
1996 
Rally for the Republic run by Alain Juppe
 
Executive Or.: Right 
Germany 2006 
CDU/CSU run by Angela Merkel 
 
Executive Or.: Right 
1996 
CDU/CSU run by Helmut Kohl 
 
Executive Or.: Right 
Greece 2000 
Pan-Hellenic Movement run by Costas 
Simitis 
 
Executive Or.: Center/Left 
1992 
New Democracy run by Constantine 
Mitsotakis 
 
Executive Or.: Right 
Ireland 1999 
Fianna Fail-Labour run by Bertie Ahern 
 
Executive Or.: Center/Right 1997 
Fianna Fail-Labour run by Albert 
Reynolds 
 
Executive Or.: Center/Right 
Italy 1996 
Technical (Non-partisan) govn.’t  
run by Lamberto Dini 
 
Executive Or.: Center 
1997 
Socialist Party run by Romano Prodi 
 
Executive Or.: Center/Left 
Netherlands 1998 
Labour Party run by William Kok 
 
Executive Or.: Center/Right 
1997 
Labour Party run by William Kok 
 
Executive Or.: Center/Right 
Portugal 1995 
Social Democratic Party run by Anibal 
Cavaco Silva 
 
Executive Or.: Right 
2001 
Socialist Party run by Antonio Gutteres 
 
Executive Or.: Left 
Spain 1998 
Popular Party run by Jose Aznar  
 
Executive Or.: Right 
1996 
Socialist Party run by Felipe Gonzales  
 
Executive Or.: Left 
Sweden 1998 
Social Democratic Labour Party run by 
Göran Persson 
 
Executive Or.: Left 
1992 
Moderate Party run by Carl Bildt 
 
Executive Or.: Right 
UK 1989 
Conservative Party run by Margaret 
Thatcher 
 
Executive Or.: Right 
1984 
Conservative Party run by Margaret 
Thatcher 
 
Executive Or.: Right 
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Appendix A2 
AR(1) Model Estimates for I/K, Π/K, Y/K 
 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
Within 
Group 
(3) 
GMM-Diff 
(4) 
GMM-SYS 
  I/K  
     
(I/K)t-1 0.540 0.307 0.377 0.394 
 (0.057) (0.076) (0.110) (0.100) 
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) - - 0.679 0.295 
     
  Π/K  
(Π/K)t-1 0.651 0.444 0.553 0.692 
 (0.055) (0.104) (0.267) (0.054) 
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) - - 0.488 0.156 
     
  Y/K  
(Y/K)t-1 0.894 0.662 0.747 0.891 
 (0.019) (0.057) (0.086) (0.019) 
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) - - 0.549 0.188 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
 
Notes. Year dummies are included in all models. (I/K), (П/K) and (Y/K) are defined in Table 2. Asymptotic 
standard errors in parenthesis. The Sargan-Hansen statistic tests the null hypothesis that the over-identifying 
restrictions are valid.  
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Appendix A3  
Robustness: OLS Estimates of a Simple Investment Model  
(Standard Errors Are Clustered at Firm, Sector and Country-sector Level) 
I/Kt 
(1) (2) (3) 
IRA Dummyt-1 (α1) 0.029 0.029 0.023 
 (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.011)** 
 (0.011)** (0.010)** (0.008)** 
 [0.016]* [0.016]* [0.013]* 
Government UCR t-1 (α2) - 0.008 0.009 
 - (0.021) (0.017) 
 - (0.024) (0.015) 
 - [0.024] [0.016] 
(I/K) t-1 - - 0.252 
 - - (0.076)*** 
 - - (0.060)*** 
 - - [0.096]** 
(Π/K)t-1 - - 0.108 
 - - (0.047)** 
 -  (0.072) 
 - - [0.046]** 
(Y/K)t-1 - - 0.014 
 - - (0.013) 
 -  (0.009) 
 - - [0.013] 
 -   
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
R squared within 0.112 0.113 0.218 
    
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 80 [625] 80 [625] 80 [625] 
 
Notes. Fixed effects estimation. (I/K), (П/K), (Y/K), IRA dummy, Government’s UCR and Political orientation 
are defined as in Table 2. All regressions include firm and year dummies. Standard errors in parentheses are 
robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group – i.e. firm, sector and country*sector level - serial correlation. 
***, **, * denote significance of the coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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Appendix A4 
Robustness: First-Differenced GMM Estimates of the Investment Equation 
I/Kt (1) (2) (3) 
(I/K)t-1 1.183*** 1.014*** 1.124*** 
 (0.252) (0.195) (0.259) 
(I/K)2t-1 -1.467*** -1.240*** -1.411*** 
 (0.370) (0.259) (0.378) 
(Π/K)t-1 0.002 0.054 -0.010 
 (0.103) (0.088) (0.082) 
(Y/K)t-1 0.019 0.009 0.015 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
IRA Dummyt-1 (α1) 0.077* 0.068** 0.244*** 
 (0.042) (0.034) (0.094) 
Government UCR t-1 (α2) - 0.061 0.066 
 - (0.052) (0.106) 
Political Orientation t-1 (α3) - -0.009 0.007 
 - (0.007) (0.010) 
Government UCR t-1* IRA (α4) - - -0.103 
 - - (0.097) 
Political Orientation t-1* IRA (α5) - - -0.018* 
 - - (0.010) 
    
P-value test on α1 + α5 = 0 - - 0.010 
P-value test on α3 + α5 = 0 - - 0.233 
    
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.001 0.002 0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.779 0.801 0.894 
    
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 0.327 [47] 0.190 [59] 0.441 [44] 
Internal Instruments 
Difference-in-Hansen tests (p-value) 
IRA Dummyt-2 0.772 0.529 0.753 
Government UCR t-2 - 0.578 0.498 
Political Orientation t-2  - 0.897 0.659 
External Instruments 
   
IP - Investor Protection 0.177 - - 
D- Disproportionality 0.920 0.547 0.324 
    
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 79[435] 79[435] 79[435] 
Notes. Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step first-differences GMM estimates. (I/K), (П/K), (Y/K), IRA dummy, 
Government’s UCR and Political orientation are defined as in Table 2. All regressions include year dummies. Investor 
Protection and Disproportionality are defined in Section 5. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to 
heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. AR(1) [AR(2)] tests the null hypothesis of no first-order 
[second-order] correlation in the differenced residuals. The Sargan-Hansen statistic tests the null hypothesis that the over-
identifying restrictions are valid. The Difference-in-Hansen statistics tests the exogeneity of subsets or individual 
instruments. ***, **, * denote significance of the coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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Appendix A5 
Robustness: The Impact of Politics for Firms Regulated by an IRA When the IRA is in Place 
I/Kt 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(I/K)t-1 0.830*** 0.856*** 
 (0.158) (0.154) 
(I/K)2t-1 -1.057*** -1.107*** 
 (0.222) (0.215) 
(Π/K)t-1 0.106 0.124 
 (0.069) (0.089) 
(Y/K)t-1 0.001 0.0002 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Government UCR t-1  0.015 0.017 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
Political Orientation t-1  -0.006* - 
 (0.003) - 
EXERLC t-1 - -0.013** 
 - (0.006) 
   
   
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.013 0.013 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.769 0.906 
   
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 0.446 [51] 0.433 [47] 
   
Firms [N. Obs.] 55[306] 55[306] 
 
Notes. Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM estimates. (I/K), (П/K), (Y/K), Government’s UCR and 
Political orientation are defined as in Table 2. EXERLC is a measure of political stance of the executive and is equal to 1 
when the executive is leftwing, 2 when it is centre, and 3 when it rightwing. All regressions include year dummies. 
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. AR(1) [AR(2)] tests 
the null hypothesis of no first-order [second-order] correlation in the differenced residuals. The Sargan-Hansen statistic 
tests the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote significance of the coefficients at 
1%, 5% and 10%. 
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